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DECODING RICHMOND: AFFIRMATIVE 




The Supreme Court's inconclusiveness in setting the constitutional 
boundaries of affirmative action in the decade following its decision in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 1 has placed a severe 
strain on its equal protection jurisprudence. Not only have the Jus-
tices been bitterly divided on whether particular forms of affirmative 
action are compatible with constitutional principles of equality,2 they 
have also been unable to agree upon which constitutional test is appro-
priate for assessing the legitimacy of preferential treatment plans. 3 
Although both proponents and opponents of the constitutionality of 
affirmative action profess to be committed to the ideal of equality,4 no 
* Professor of Law, Yeshiva University. B.A. 1969, M.A. (French) 1971, Columbia; J.D. 
1974, Northwestern; M.Phil. (Philosophy) 1978, Columbia. - Ed. This Article is adapted from 
a forthcoming book entitled Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equal Protection: A Philosophical 
and Constitutional Reappraisal, scheduled to be published in 1990 by Yale University Press. I 
am grateful to David Carlson, Karen Gross, Arthur Jacobson, David Rudenstine, and Charles 
Yablon for their helpful and insightful comments and suggestions. 
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
2. In none of the affirmative action cases in which the Court considered the constitutional 
question bas a majority joined together in a single opinion. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149 (1987) (in a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a racial 
quota in state trooper promotions, but failed to issue a majority opinion); Local 28, Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (in another five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a 29.23% minority membership goal for a union guilty of egregious discrimi-
nation, but issued only a plurality opinion on the constitutional issue); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (in a five-to-four decision, the Court held racially preferential layoffs 
of public school teachers to be unconstitutional, but again without a majority opinion); Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (by a six-to-three vote, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a congressionally mandated set-aside for minority business enterprises in federally funded pub-
lic work projects, but failed to agree upon a majority opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (four mem-
bers of the Court, led by Justice Brennan, found the use of racial quotas in medical school 
admissions constitutional, one Justice found it unconstitutional, and the remaining four Justices 
found it invalid on statutory grounds). 
3. Compare Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299, 309-10 (applying the strict 
scrutiny test) with Justice Brennan's opinion in the same case, 438 U.S. at 359-62 (applying the 
intermediate scrutiny test). 
4. Compare, for example, Justice Blackmun's statement in support of the affirmative action 
program in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407, to the effect that "in order to treat certain persons equally, 
we must treat them differently," with Justice Stewart's statement in opposition to the affirmative 
action program involved in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 526, that "[n]othing in [the] language [of the 
fourteenth amendment] singles out some 'persons' for more 'equal' treatment than others." Also, 
compare Reynolds, An Equal Opportunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1987) (equality re: 
1729 
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compromise on the proper method to achieve that ideal looms on the 
horizon. 
The divisiveness of the issue is unsurprising, insofar as affirmative 
action throws into question widely accepted notions of equality, such 
as the idea that each person is entitled to equal treatment by the state.5 
More generally, affirmative action has been linked, in often complex 
and problematic ways, with very different conceptions of equality. 
Some have associated it with equality of result;6 others, with equality 
of opportunity.7 Among the latter, moreover, there is disagreement as 
to whether affirmative action promotes or undermines equality of op-
portunity. 8 Such questions are further complicated because the pur-
poses to be served by affirmative action plans can differ widely, 
ranging from the narrowly compensatory to the broadly distributive.9 
Finally, at an even higher level of abstraction, it can be fiercely dis-
quires repudiation of affirmative action) with Hooks, Affirmative Action: A Needed Remedy, 21 
GA. L. REv. 1043 (1987) (the achievement of equality requires the use of affirmative action). 
5. As one of the framers of the fourteenth amendment stated: 
[T]he Jaw which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all. Whatever law pun-
ishes a white man for a crime, shall punish the black man precisely in the same way and to 
the same degree. Whatever Jaw protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to 
the black man. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens). In the same vein, 
Justice Powell stressed in his opinion in Bakke that "(i]t is far too late to argue that the guarantee 
of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of 
protection greater than that accorded others." 438 U.S. at 295. 
6. See, e.g., N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUB· 
LIC POLICY 33-77 (1975) (arguing that advocates of affirmative action seek "statistical parity" 
rather than equality of opportunity); Reynolds, supra note 4, at 1018 (affirmative action advo-
cates would substitute a "forced equality of result" for the "fourteenth amendment's guarantee of 
equality of opportunity"). 
7. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (The Supreme Court's recognition of the legitimacy of affirmative action "af-
firms the constitutional power of Federal and State Governments to act affirmatively to achieve 
equal opportunity for all."); Hooks, supra note 4, at 1058 (affirmative action advocates seek 
equality of opportunity, not equality of result). 
8. Compare Justice Brennan's position, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-79 with Justice Rehnquist's 
position, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Title VII's statutory purpose of promoting equality of opportunity forecloses the 
use of racial quotas). 
9. The distinction between "compensatory" and "distributive" purposes is based on Aris-
totle's distinction between compensatory and distributive justice as two complementary aspects 
of justice. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. v (D. Ross trans. 1980). Distributive 
justice refers to the fair division and distribution of benefits and burdens among members of a 
society. See Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophical and Constitu-
tional Appraisal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 860 (1985). Moreover, "distribution" can be broadly used 
to denote both the process of distribution and the product of such distribution. See J. FEINBERG, 
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 107-08 (1973). 
Compensatory justice, on the other hand, can be defined as "the voluntary or involuntary 
exchange of equivalents designed to restore the equilibrium between two agents who voluntarily 
or involuntarily have become engaged in some transaction." Rosenfeld, supra, at 860. Examples 
of compensatory justice include damages paid by tort-feasors to their victims, or by a party 
breaching a contract. See id. at 860 n.70. 
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puted whether affirmative action promotes or undermines equal worth 
and equal dignity and respect for all persons.10 
Emerging from this jurisprudence of dim uncertainties and fragile 
pluralities, the Court's ability to assemble a majority in its recent deci-
sion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 11 therefore marks an im-
portant turning point. Croson declared unconstitutional a minority 
business enterprise ("MBE") set-aside program devised by the Rich-
mond, Virginia, City Council. 12 The holding and tenor of the Court's 
opinion stand in sharp contrast with the Court's 1980 decision in Ful-
lilove v. Klutznick, 13 where virtually identical federally mandated set-
asides were found to be constitutional. Although the two cases are 
technically distinguishable, 14 and although it is certainly too early to 
assess the full impact of Croson, the clear change in direction signaled 
by the holding in Croson seems likely to strike a major blow against 
long-standing, concerted efforts to narrow the economic gap between 
black and white entrepreneurs. 
In Croson, a majority on the Court for the first time has settled on 
a single standard - the strict scrutiny test - to determine the consti-
tutionality of affirmative action based on race. 15 Thus, the Court now 
appears willing to subject affirmative action programs designed to ben-
efit blacks to the same equal protection standard applied to other, less 
beneficial racial classifications.16 Advocates of affirmative action can 
take heart that all nine Justices acknowledged the constitutionality of 
racially based preferences, but if Croson is noteworthy it is because of 
10. Compare A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) ("a racial quota derogates 
the human dignity and individuality of all to whom it is applied") with R. DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227-29 (1978) (affirmative action is consistent with individual right to equal 
respect and concern). 
11. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
12. 109 S. Ct. at 717-20. 
13. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
14. In Fullilove, the set-aside was mandated by Congress, which was acting, inter alia, pursu-
ant to its special powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472. 
The opinions of both Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia in Croson lay great emphasis on distin-
guishing Fullilove on the grounds that what is permissible for Congress under § 5 of the four-
teenth amendment may be forbidden to state and municipal governments under § 1. See Croson, 
109 S. Ct. at 719-20 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); at 736-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment). Justices Kennedy and Marshall disagreed with Justices O'Connor and Scalia on this 
point, however, rejecting the proposition that a law that violates equal protection when enacted 
by a state could become a guarantee of equal protection if enacted by Congress. See 109 S. Ct. at 
734-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); at 754-57 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). · 
15. 109 S. Ct. at 721-22. 
16. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (under the strict scrutiny test, a 
legal classification must be "necessary" to achieve a "compelling" state purpose); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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the high threshold for validity it establishes, 17 a threshold that may 
prove difficult to meet. 
Yet, what is truly remarkable about Croson is what lurks beneath 
the surface, beyond the apparent reconciliation between the constitu-
tional jurisprudence on affirmative action and generally accepted prin-
ciples of equal protection. Indeed, the seeming order emerging from 
Croson's embrace of the strict scrutiny test is not the product of any 
genuine resolution of the divisive issues posed by affirmative action. 
While on the surface, Croson announces a new order built upon the 
conceptual apparatus generated in the course of the preceding consti-
tutional debate on affirmative action, underneath there remain the 
same turmoil and uncertainty that have previously thwarted the 
Court's efforts to overcome conflict and fragmentation. 
Croson achieves its superficial order through a process of decontex-
tualization. As we shall see, such decontextualization takes many 
forms, including lifting race relations out of their historical setting; 18 
treating process as though it were unrelated to any content;19 "disag-
gregating" evidence so as to produce the impression that tightly linked 
and mutually reinforcing facts actually stand apart;20 and dealing with 
key conceptual constructs as though they were self-sustaining when 
actually they are dependent on particular theoretical assumptions and 
on the existence of certain specified sets of facts.21 In light of this 
decontextualization, the strict scrutiny test as applied in Croson ap-
pears as an abstract, detached, and purely formal procedure rather 
than as a substantially fair and practically oriented means to resolve 
conflicting claims to constitutional entitlement under the equal protec-
tion clause. 22 Ironically, the inadequacy of the strict scrutiny test in 
affirmative action cases is dramatically illustrated by the fact that 
while a majority on the Croson Court agreed that strict scrutiny was 
the proper test to apply, no such majority could concur on the circum-
stances under which affirmative action would be constitutionally per-
missible under this test. 23 
17. Consistent with the majority's adoption of the strict scrutiny test, an affirmative action 
program would be constitutional if it set a racial classification that was necessarily related to a 
compelling course of action instituted for the benefit of a racial minority. This standard sets a 
very high threshold for the validity of affirmative action plans, but is acceptable to all the current 
Justices on the Court. 
18. See infra Part IV; see also Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal 
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. - (forthcoming Aug. 1989). 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Parts II and IV. 
21. See infra Part IV. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. See id. 
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This Article examines the process of decontextualization with an 
eye toward assessing Croson's implications for the broader debate on 
the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action. Since the nature, 
scope, and purpose of decontextualization can only be understood in 
terms of the particular context it suppresses, ignores, alters, or dis-
torts, it is necessary to be cognizant of the nature of the actual context 
which Croson suppresses; only in this way is it possible to understand 
the meaning of the suppression and the purpose of the particular in-
stance of decontextualization. This requires a reconstruction, or "re-
contextualization,'' of the circumstances from which the Croson case 
arose. 
This Article argues, based on the most salient forms of decontextu-
alization found in Croson and on the reconstructions necessary to 
render that decontextualization sufficiently intelligible, that adoption 
of the strict scrutiny test is not warranted in affirmative action cases. 
Moreover, an examination of the aims that led-the Court to use decon-
textualization in Croson reveals that a process-based approach, such as 
that provided by the strict scrutiny test, is an unsatisfactory means by 
which to circumscribe the constitutional boundaries of affirmative ac-
tion. The inadequacy of the strict scrutiny test's process-based ap-
proach is particularly evident when contrasted with an approach that 
relies explicitly on substantive values. 24 This does not mean that it is 
24. For an extended discussion of the difference between process-based theories and substan-
tive theories of judicial review of equal protection claims, see M. ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION, JUSTICE, AND EQUAL PROTECTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REAP-
PRAISAL (forthcoming 1990). Although there are several versions.of process-based theory, the 
principal characteristic that all the versions share is the belief that it is possible for judges to 
render equal protection decisions without relying on their own substantive moral or political 
values. Some process-based theories regard the role of the judge as being purely formal. Thus, 
the antidiscrimination principle, which underlies the strict scrutiny test and which simply re-
quires that there be a "fit" between legislative means and ends has been interpreted as being 
purely formal. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFEREN-
TIAL TREATMENT 84, 85, 89-91 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1977); O'Fallon, Adjudi-
cation and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 19, 51 (1979) 
(The antidiscrimination principle "proceeds from an assumption that the requirement of equality 
established by the equal protection clause is purely formal, insisting only that like cases be 
treated alike.") (footnote omitted); see also Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977) (There is "a widely shared assumption that the 
equal protection clause lacks substantive content."). Furthermore, the antidiscrimination princi-
ple supposedly promotes value neutrality, by limiting the judge's role to the apparently purely 
mechanical and quantitative task of matching means to ends. See Fiss, supra, at 97-98. Another 
kind of process-based theory focuses on the political process and limits judicial intervention to 
the identification and rectification of defects in the majoritarian democratic political process. 
This political process theory is derived from the Supreme Court's famous Carolene Products 
footnote, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and its most promi-
nent exponent is John Ely. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). See infra Parts II and V for further discussion of this approach. 
Substantive theories of judicial review, on the other hand, assert that judges cannot resolve 
constitutional issues - especially those arising from vague and open-ended constitutional provi-
sions such as the equal protection clause - without directly relying on substantive values. See, 
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impossible to find a principled manner by which to assess the constitu-
tional permissibility of affirmative action. What it does mean is that 
such a determination must be made in terms of the "constitutionaliza-
tion" of some conception of substantive equality.25 Perhaps the most 
important lesson to be drawn from Croson is this: that it is impossible 
to come to any principled conclusion regarding the constitutionality of 
affirmative action without (at least implicitly) subscribing to a particu-
lar conception of substantive equality. 
The final objective of this Article is to indicate how the constitu-
tional issues raised in Croson, when fully reintegrated into the actual 
context from which they emerged, can be coherently and systemati-
cally resolved by reference to particular principles of substantive 
equality. Of course, the actual outcome of such a resolution depends 
on the nature of whatever principle of substantive equality is deemed 
properly applicable. Selections among available principles must not 
only be made but also persuasively defended as constitutionally per-
missible. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt a full justifi-
cation for the choice of any particular principle. Nevertheless, there 
are sound reasons for selecting the equality-of-opportunity principle to 
illustrate the thesis that the affirmative action issues raised in Croson 
can be resolved through adherence to principles of substantive equal-
ity. Indeed, while the Court has 'neither been explicit nor fully consis-
tent on this point, at least in the context of race relations, it has 
interpreted the equal protection clause as constitutionalizing the prin-
ciple of equality of opportunity.26 
This Article first briefly considers the conceptual and constitu-
tional framework out of which the controversy in Croson emerges. 
Next, the Article turns to Croson itself, and focuses on the Court's 
adoption of the strict scrutiny test, on the disagreement among the 
e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 147 ("Our constitutional system rests on a particular moral 
theory, namely, that men have moral rights against the state. The difficult clauses of the Bill of 
Rights, like the ... equal protection clause[], must be understood as appealing to moral concep-
tions .... "); Morris, Interpretive and Noninterpretive Constitutional Theory, 94 ETHICS 501, 509 
(1984) ("[I]nsofar as the [C]onstitution contains fundamental ethical terms like ••• equality 
without expressly indicating how to interpret them, the [C]onstitution embodies some particular 
moral theories, namely, the most plausible ones, and the job of the judge is to identify and use 
them as bases for decision."). Moreover, several constitutional scholars have argued that the 
equal protection clause "constitutionalizes" particular moral values. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, 
LAW'S EMPIRE 381 (1986) [hereinafter LAW'S EMPIRE] ("equal concern"); Baker, Outcome 
Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 
933, 938 n.15 (1983) ("equality of respect principle"); Karst, supra, at 5 ("equal citizenship 
principle"). 
25. For a definition of substantive or prescriptive equality as contrasted with descriptive 
equality, see infra note 63 and text accompanying notes 63-66. 
26. See Rosenfeld, supra note 9, at 883-87; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 984 (1975). 
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Justices concerning the test's meaning and implications, and on the 
Court's use of decontextualization to manipulate the key conceptual 
and factual issues at stake. Finally, drawing upon the principle of 
equality of opportunity, the Article endeavors to demonstrate how the 
adoption of particular principles of substantive equality can lead to a 
comprehensive and coherent constitutional resolution of the affirma-
tive action issues raised in Croson. 
I. THE CONCEPTUAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court handed down nine decisions on affirmative ac-
tion in the decade preceding Croson. 27 Taken together, what is most 
remarkable about these decisions is their failure to establish authorita-
tively or clearly the constitutional boundaries of affirmative action. 28 
Nevertheless, since the Court's 1978 decision in Bakke, two distinct 
positions have emerged. The first, advanced by Justice Powell in that 
case, interprets equal protection as requiring that the same protection 
be given to every person regardless of race. 29 The second is perhaps 
best captured by Justice Blackmun's statement in Bakke that "in order 
to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently."30 The 
first position promotes equal treatment, or "marginal equality."31 The 
second position stresses equal results, or "global equality,"32 even if 
that requires imposing or tolerating marginal inequalities. Adoption 
of the marginal equality position is obviously less likely to lead to ac-
ceptance of affirmative action (or to a broad endorsement of it). Be-
yond that, however, it is unclear from the cases whether a sound 
justification could be found for preferring either of these positions over 
the other. 
A more detailed picture of these two positions emerges from the 
27. These nine decisions, in chronological order, are Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448 (1980); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Local No. 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa 
Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
28. See Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial Classi-
fications: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 low A L. REV. 255 (1987); cf. Schwartz, The 
1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over But the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REv. 524 
(1987). 
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-320. 
30. 438 U.S. at 407. 
31. "Marginal equality is defined with respect to (often small) changes from the status quo, 
with the changes being equal in magnitude for all." D. RAE, D. YATES, J. HOCHSCHILD, J. 
MORONE & c. FESSLER, EQUALITIES 51 (1981) [hereinafter D. RAE]. 
32. "Global equality is defined with respect to holdings above zero, with their amounts or 
end states being equal." Id. 
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realization that each tends to go hand in hand with a different consti-
tutional test and a different conception of justice. Justices who adhere 
to the marginal equality position generally link equal treatment to the 
strict scrutiny test and to acceptance of affirmative action as constitu-
tional only when it serves narrowly compensatory goals.33 Proponents 
of the global equality position, on the other hand, are willing to allow 
preferential treatment so long as it meets the less stringent intermedi-
ate scrutiny test and is consistent with legitimate objectives of distribu-
tive justice or with aims that are at least in part distributive. 34 
Although some Justices, in the course of formulating their opin-
ions in affirmative action cases, have cited with approval Justice John 
Marshall Harlan's famous admonition that "[o]ur Constitution is 
color blind,"35 none has, in fact, strictly adhered to that maxim. Nor 
is such adhesion mandated even by the strict scrutiny test that has 
long been the accepted constitutional standard in cases involving ra-
cial classifications that disadvantage a racial minority. Indeed, con-
fronted with racial classifications designed to benefit rather than 
disadvantage racial minorities, Justices committed to the marginal 
equality position have declared that affirmative action satisfies the 
strict scrutiny test, as long as it is narrowly compensatory - i.e., if it 
is provided by an actual wrongdoer to redress the harm inflicted upon 
actual victims. 36 In short, the marginal equality position requires that 
the state afford all persons equal treatment regardless of race, except 
that temporarily unequal treatment on the basis of race is permissible 
if it is necessary to enable the state to compensate the actual victims of 
racially discriminatory laws, policies, or conduct. 
It seems intuitively correct that the narrowly compensatory use of 
affirmative action approved by the proponents of the marginal equality 
position serves a "compelling" state interest. It is, however, much 
more difficult to understand why the use of affirmative action for dis-
tributive or somewhat less rigidly compensatory purposes is not 
equally "compelling." Indeed, why should justice in the distribution 
33. A good example is Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-320. In response to 
the Davis Medical School's argument that its program served the purpose of "countering the 
effects of societal discrimination," 438 U.S. at 306, Powell stated that the Court has "never 
approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups 
at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administra-
tive findings of constitutional ... violations." 438 U.S. at 307. 
34. Representative of this approach is Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke. See 438 U.S. at 
355-62. Also for an endorsement of a purely distributive use of affirmative action, see Justice 
Stevens' dissent in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-20 (1986). 
35. See e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stewart; J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
36. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 353; Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative 
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81 (1986). 
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of state-owned or state-controlled goods or services - such as public 
education, public employment, and public works contracts - be 
deemed a less compelling state interest than the achievement of com-
pensatory justice? And why should courts require that affirmative ac-
tion remedies remain close to the paradigm of compensation, 37 but not 
allow compensation from a particularly reprehensible wrongdoer or 
for a severely harmed victim if the remedy otherwise significantly 
strays from the paradigm (e.g., if it compensates nonvictims or is un-
dertaken by nonwrongdoers )? 
In fact, while the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions 
before Croson do not provide any satisfactory answers to these ques-
tions, some of the cases do approve preferential treatment pla~s that 
would be clearly invalid under the marginal equality position. Thus, 
in some decisions, the Court has approved plans imposed on actual 
wrongdoers, but which benefit persons who were not actual victims. 38 
The Court has also acknowledged the legitimacy of plans undertaken 
by non wrongdoers for the benefit of actual victims. 39 And, in the only 
case concerning the permissibility of an affirmative action plan 
designed to benefit women, the Court endorsed a plan that arguably 
involved a nonwrongdoer voluntarily dispensing preferential treat-
ment to a c:lass induding nonvictims.40 Furthermore, some Justices 
have bestowed constitutional legitimacy on plans that appear to be in 
part compensatory and in part distributive,41 and at least one Justice 
has gone so far as to defend the constitutionality of purely forward-
looking plans with an exclusively distributive focus.42 
Unlike the marginal equality position, the global equality position 
may seem capable of justifying the above-mentioned decisions and 
37. The paradigm of compensation can be defined as the case where the wrongdoer's unjust 
enrichment is equivalent to the victim's loss, and where compensation puts both wrongdoer and 
victim in the position in which they would have been, absent the wrong. As an example, suppose 
a thief steals $10 from a victim and earns $1 in interest while holding on to the money - the 
same amount which the victim would have earned as interest had she not been deprived of her 
$10. In that case a payment of $11 from the thief to the victim would fit within the paradigm of 
compensation. For a more extended discussion of the paradigm case and its relation to other 
cases of compensation, see M. ROSENFELD, supra note 24, at ch. I. 
38. See Local 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
39. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
40. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
Johnson arose in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 rather than under the 
equal protection clause. Nevertheless, Johnson sheds important light on the constitutionality of 
gender-based affirmative action as there is substantial overlap between the relevant statutory and 
constitutional criteria in the case of public employers. 
41. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 
153-86; see also M. ROSENFELD, supra note 24, ch. VII. 
42. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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op1mons. The global equality position relies on the intermediate scru-
tiny test used most notably by the Court in gender discrimination 
cases. 43 Because it tolerates a looser "fit" than the strict scrutiny 
test,44 the intermediate scrutiny test appears, at first, to confer consti-
tutional legitimacy on a range of affirmative action plans that would be 
either questionable or downright impermissible under strict scrutiny. 
Further consideration, however, reveals that both the intermediate 
and the strict scrutiny tests suffer from the same shortcoming. Indeed, 
the intermediate scrutiny test does not provide the means to distin-
guish between "important" and "nonimportant" state interests any 
more than the strict scrutiny test is genuinely capable of distinguishing 
between "compelling" and "noncompelling" state interests. Whereas 
the global equality position customarily links the intermediate scrutiny 
test with the constitutional legitimacy of unequal treatment in the con-
text of race, 45 the test does not necessarily require that result. Actu-
ally, since as early as Bakke, Justices who are proponents of the global 
equality position have acknowledged that affirmative action cases do 
not fit neatly into the "prior analytic framework."46 Although these 
Justices have paid lip service to the intermediate scrutiny test, what 
really distinguishes their approach from that of Justices who insist on 
marginal equality is that they focus on the classes affected by preferen-
tial treatment rather than on the nature of the classifications 
involved.47 
Exclusive focus on a classification in the abstract without regard to 
its disparate impact on the different classes which it affects is likely to 
inhibit unnecessarily the constitutional legitimation of unequal treat-
ment. For example, a particular racial classification would be equally 
invalid (or valid) regardless of whether it disadvantaged (or ad-
vantaged) blacks or whites. On the other hand, if the focus shifts from 
the nature of the classification to the benefits or detriments which it 
may bring to the particular classes affected, then unequal treatment 
may be justified and constitutionally permissible. Thus, if for instance, 
preferential admissions for whites at a state university would have a 
devastating effect on an already underrepresented class of black appli-
43. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (under the intermediate scrutiny test, 
the challenged state conduct or policy must be "substantially related" to the achievement of an 
"important" state purpose). 
44. Indeed, to satisfy the "substantially related" criterion, see supra note 43, the challenged 
state action need not be "necessary" to the achievement of the identified state purpose. 
45. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359-79 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
46. 438 U.S. at 358 (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
47. See Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Dis-
trust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 107 (1984). 
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cants, but preferential admissions for blacks would have a compara-
tively minor adverse effect on the class of white applicants, then 
affirmative action favoring blacks applicants could be constitutionally 
permissible even if affirmative action favoring whites clearly were not. 
Focusing on th~ identity of the classes affected rather than on the 
nature of the classifications themselves may seem at first a more prom-
ising analytical framework by which to bring order to the Court's me-
andering affirmative action jurisprudence than either strict or 
intermediate scrutiny. Moreover, because the focus on classes affords 
greater justification to unequal treatment, it is more compatible with 
the pursuit of global equality. Viewed more closely, however, the fo-
cus on classes appears to be similarly insufficient. For one thing, the 
results in three of the nine affirmative action cases decided by the 
Court before Croson seem inconsistent with the global equality posi-
tion. 48 For another, the disparate impact that a particular classifica-
tion may have on the various classes which it affects may seem to 
justify unequal treatment. But disparate impact does not automati-
cally justify any particular instance of unequal treatment. Would, for 
example, an absolute preference for blacks in public education and 
public employment be justifiable so long as whites remain the domi-
nant political and economic group? Or would a limited preference for 
purposes that are at least in part compensatory be constitutional? 
Whatever the correct answers to these questions may be, they cannot 
be directly or exclusively derived from the fact that there are social, 
political, and economic disparities between the races. Accordingly, 
even if focusing on classes leads to the acceptance of unequal treat-
ment as legitimate, it fails to supply sufficient means to reconcile or 
assess properly the various Supreme Court affirmative action 
decisions. 
Both the antidiscrimination principle49 - which underlies the 
strict and intermediate scrutiny tests - and the focus on the status of 
the class disadvantaged by a given legal classification are supposed to 
provide a process-based means of judicially determining equal protec-
tion claims. 50 Because they are believed to interfere less with the will 
of a state's democratic majority, process-based judicial approaches are 
48. These cases are Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local 
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978). In all three of these cases, the proponents of the contested affirmative action 
plan involved unsuccessfully sought to justify the unequal treatment it entailed on global equality 
grounds. 
49. See supra note 24. 
50. Concentration on the nature of the disadvantaged class can be fit within a process·based 
approach, provided that one understands "process" to mean the democratic political process as 
conceived in Carolene-based theories. See supra note 24, -and infra text accompanying notes 53-
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deemed preferable to those that rely on the implementation of substan-
tive values.51 By concentrating on the fit between legislative means 
and ends, the tests under the antidiscrimination principle give the im-
pression that judges need only perform a formal, mechanistic role, 
without having to pass judgment on the substantive values underlytng 
the legislative choice. 52 This impression is misleading, however, for as 
we have seen, neither the determination of the applicable level of scru-
tiny nor the sufficiency of a particular fit between means and ends can 
be mechanistically or purely procedurally derived. Indeed, to decide, 
for example, whether a state legislative end is "important" or "com-
pelling," one must resort to substantive normative values by which 
one can establish a ranking of diverse state objectives. 
Focus on the classes affected by a legal classification can also be 
linked to a process-based means of adjudicating equal protection 
claims. In its famous footnote four in Carolene Products, the Court 
declared that heightened scrutiny may be appropriate when state ac-
tion is shaped by "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities. "53 In the 
broadest terms, as interpreted under the process-based theory derived 
from Carolene Products, the equal protection clause entitles each per-
son to be free from purely arbitrary state action and to participate 
fairly in the political process. 54 Provided these conditions are met, the 
will of the majority, as expressed through the legislative enactments of 
the state, should prevail, and judicial interference would be unwar-
ranted. One would expect, if the majoritarian process operates fairly 
and efficiently, that over time most individuals would find themselves 
sometimes in the majority and sometimes in the minority.55 Members 
of discrete and insular groups, however, are always likely to find them-
54. Accordingly, if the disadvantaged class is "insular and discrete" the classification ought to be 
impermissible; otherwise, it sh,ould be legitimate. 
51. For a comprehensive elaboration of this position, see J. ELY, supra note 24. But see 
Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981), and Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence 
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (questioning the possibility of 
separating matters of process from matters of substance). 
52. Fiss, supra note 24, at 97-98. 
53. United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a systematic 
elaboration of this process-based jurisprudence, see J. ELY, supra note 24. 
54. The protection against arbitrary state action is constitutionalized through the minimum-
scrutiny prong of the antidiscrimination principle applied in equal protection cases involving 
economic classifications. According to the minimum scrutiny test, a legal classification is consti-
tutionally permissible if "rationally related" to a "legitimate" state purpose. See, e.g., Railways 
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
55. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV, 723, 
733 n.44 (1974). 
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selves as losers in the majoritarian process. This is not because they 
embrace causes that are intrinsically unappealing .to the majority of 
their fellow citizens. Rather it is because, acting out of prejudice 
against them, the majority discourages their participation in the pro-
cess and uses the majoritarian process to ensure that minorities remain 
isolated and disempowered.56 Under these circumstances, judicial in-
tervention is justified, not to impose substantive values, but to restore 
the integrity of the majoritarian process. 
If this theory were sound and if constitutional equality could be 
reduced to the right of unimpeded participation in the majoritarian 
process, concentration on whether the class disadvantaged by a partic-
ular state action constitutes an isolated and disempowered minority 
would provide a·principled and coherent way to assess the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action plans. Unfortunately, it becomes clear 
upon further consideration that the approach based on the integrity of 
the majoritarian process presupposes the acceptance of certain sub-
stantive values, and that constitutional equality cannot be persuasively 
confined merely to a right of unimpeded participation in the 
majoritarian process. 57 
Even concepts such as the "integrity of the majoritarian process" 
or "discrete and insular minority" cannot be given ·a sufficiently deter-
minate meaning without reference to substantive values, and prove to 
be as malleable as the concepts of "compelling" and "important" state 
interests. 58 For example, what role, if any, should the fact of substan-
tial disparities in education, access to information or power, or cul-
tural background play in determining whether a majoritarian process 
operates with integrity? There can be no coherent answer to this ques-
tion unless the notion of a properly functioning majoritarian process is 
situated in a concrete setting shaped by substantive values and 
objectives. 
56. See J. ELY, supra note 24, at 152-70 (relationship between majority, through its elected 
representatives, and discrete and insular minorities is a "we-they" relationship based on prejudice 
and stereotype; minority legislators may be prone to embrace the official majority position in-
stead of fighting to discredit it, and because of this, "out" groups are likely to be deprived of fair 
representation). 
57. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 n.4 (1985) 
(Carolene Products concerned with substantive political outcomes rather than process alone). 
Carolene's focus on pluralist bargaining has subtly encouraged the belief that pluralism is 
the alpha and the omega of the American constitutional system, and that any effort by the 
courts to challenge the substantive values generated by legislative compromise is necessarily 
antidemocratic. 
We must repudiate this reduction of the American Constitution to a simple system of 
pluralist bargaining .... 
Id. at 743. 
58. See id. at 740 (courts can only uproot prejudice against members of a group on the basis 
of substantive moral values). 
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Constitutional equality may well require untrammeled participa-
tion in the majoritarian process, but it cannot be limited to that. Even 
if constitutional equality were confined to a right of equal protection 
against purely arbitrary or irrational state action, it would have to en-
compass more than a guarantee of the right to participate in the 
majoritarian process. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that a properly 
functioning majoritarian process could lead to state action that would 
arbitrarily disadvantage a class of individuals who do not belong to 
any discrete or insular group. And, since the distinction between 
purely arbitrary disadvantages and those that are rationally tolerable 
requires more than an exclusively process-based inquiry, constitu-
tional equality must place some reliance on substantive values.59 
In the last analysis, while application of the judicial tests associated 
with the antidiscrimination principle and with Carolene Products re-
quires recourse to substantive values, implementation of these tests in 
the context of racial classifications that tend to impose disproportion-
ate burdens on blacks may still appear to be essentially procedural in 
nature. This is in part because there is such a widespread consensus 
concerning the particular substantive values involved - namely, that 
state-sanctioned racism and unequal treatment of blacks that relegates 
them to the position of inferiors or outcasts is utterly unjust. There is 
thus ordinarily no need for explicit elaboration or justification of these 
values in the course of judicial determinations of the constitutional 
validity of a given state action. 60 But the fact that no dispute arises 
concerning the substantive values implicated does not mean that judi-
cial decisionmaking can avoid reliance on such values. The "proce-
dural" flavor these cases have is purely an illusion - a function of 
simply forgetting the unspoken consensus on substantive values that 
remain in the background. Under the Carolene Products approach, it 
simply seems obvious, in light of the long history of racism in the 
United States, that blacks are a "discrete and insular" group that has 
been prevented from full and fair participation in the majoritarian pro-
59. In other words, the minimum scrutiny test under the antidiscrimination principle, see 
supra note 54 and accompanying text, requires the courts to draw a distinction between "ra· 
tional" and "arbitrary" state means - a distinction that is hardly more self-evident or quantifi· 
able than the distinction between "substantially related" and "less than substantially related" 
means made pursuant to the intermediate scrutiny test. 
60. This is by no means to suggest that racism in America has disappeared. Rather, the 
point is that the legal discourse concerning race-related issues among judges, legal practitioners, 
and legal scholars is premised on the proposition that treating blacks as inferiors is morally, 
legally, and constitutionally reprehensible. Thus, even as adamant a foe of race-based affirmative 
action as William Bradford Reynolds, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil 
Rights Division of the Justice Department during the Reagan administration, has declared his 
commitment to the principle of equality among the races. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 1041. 
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cess, and that the continuing denial of that participation is substan-
tively unjust. 
In the context of affirmative action, where racial classifications are 
drawn for the benefit of blacks, on the other hand, there is nothing 
approaching an underlying consensus relating to applicable substan-
tive values. 61 This is made plain by the clash between the two judicial 
positions formulated by the Justices who addressed the constitutional 
issue in Bakke. Moreover, as we have seen, the strict scrutiny test 
itself does not provide the means by which to resolve this clash. 
Therefore, in affirmative action cases, the strict scrutiny test cannot 
give judges a purely process-based means of deciding equal protection 
claims. Furthermore, the Carolene Products approach cannot yield 
determinate results in affirmative action cases, as there is even disa-
greement concerning the proper definition of the group disadvantaged 
by state-sanctioned racial preferences.62 Ultimately, in all cases, the 
outcome of the strict scrutiny test or of the Carolene Products ap-
proach is dependent on a judicial choice among substantive values. In 
affirmative action cases, however, this choice must be among contested 
values and therefore seems bound to appear much more intrusive than 
in other cases where it merely reflects a broad-based consensus. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's emphasis on what appear, 
in the abstract, to be largely process-based concerns, one can find in its 
affirmative action decisions preceding Croson significant indications of 
judicial commitment to particular substantive values. These values 
have served to inform the nature and scope of constitutional equality 
as defined by the Court. Indeed, beneath the Court's preoccupation 
with matters of process, there lurk definite traces of visions of substan-
tive equality.63 
The equal protection clause is too general and open-ended to com-
61. See supra notes 4 & 10. 
62. Compare Ely, supra note 55 (the white majority is the disadvantaged group) with Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978) (disadvantaged groups are various white 
ethnic groups, each of which constitutes a political minority). 
63. Substantive or prescriptive equality must be distinguished from descriptive equality. See, 
e.g., Westen, The Concept of Equal Opportunity, 95 ETHICS 837, 842-43 (1985). Prescriptive 
equality refers to who ought to be equal to whom - e.g., one group to another or every individual 
to every other individual, regardless of race or sex - and in what respect they ought to be equal 
to one another - e.g., according to need, merit, or rank. Descriptive equality, on the other 
hand, focuses on who is equal to whom and on what is equal to what, according to some recog-
nized standard of measurement. See id. In addition, different standards of prescriptive equality 
may require different configurations of descriptive equalities and inequalities. For example, if 
justice requires that each individual be treated equally according to merit, then individuals of 
equal merit should be treated equally and those of unequal merit unequally. And accordingly, 
(descriptive) equal treatment of persons of (descriptively) unequal merit would violate the appli-
cable canons of prescriptive equality. 
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pel any particular conception of substantive equality. 64 Nor has the 
Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the equal protection clause, 
consistently embraced any particular conception of substantive equal-
ity. Nevertheless, in its affirmative action decisions, and in other deci-
sions concerning race relations going back to Brown v. Board of 
Education, 65 the Court has read the equal protection clause as consti-
tutionalizing the principle of equal opportunity. 66 At a higher level of 
abstraction, these same equal protection decisions can be viewed as 
constitutionalizing the principle of equal worth, equal dignity, and 
equal respect for all individual members of society. 67 
When a conception of substantive equality specifically relies on the 
principle of equal opportunity, it becomes possible to identify the 
proper roles for distributive and compensatory justice. 68 Distributive 
justice would be satisfied if all distributions of scarce goods were made 
in accordance with the principle of equality of opportunity. Further-
more, compensatory justice would be realized if the harms resulting 
from deprivations of equal opportunity to compete for scarce goods 
were fully compensated. But even if these specifications were strictly 
followed by the Court, its conception of substantive equality developed 
prior to Croson would still be too vague to permit a cogent determina-
tion of the proper constitutional boundaries of affirmative action. And 
the reason for this is that unless the principle of equality of opportu-
nity is sufficiently fleshed out, it is unclear whether or not it can justify 
affirmative action. 69 
In the last analysis, the two positions that emerge out of Bakke can 
neither be satisfactorily reconciled, nor can a principled choice be 
made between them, because the Court's affirmative action decisions 
before Croson yield a conception of substantive equality that is not 
sufficiently specific. Even though there seems to be a convergence of 
opinion on the Court concerning what substantive equality requires at 
higher levels of abstraction, the clash between the marginal equalitY 
64. See LA W's EMPIRE, supra note 24, at 382 (equal protection constitutionalizes the concept 
of equality, but not any particular conception of it). 
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
66: See 347 U.S. at 493 ("In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms."); Rosenfeld, supra note 9, at 886-87. 
67. See supra note 24. 
68. For a more extended discussion of the relation between compensatory and distributive 
justice in the context to adherence to the principle of equality of opportunity, see infra Part VI. 
For a general discussion of the relation between compensatory and distributive justice, see M. 
ROSENFELD, supra note 24, ch. I; Rosenfeld, supra note 9, at 860-65. 
69. See supra note 8. 
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and global equality positions suggests conflicting conceptions of what 
substantive equality requires in concrete situations. Hence, on the eve 
of its decision in Croson, the Court had left us with certain broad out-
lines of a conception of substantive equality that satisfies the constitu-
tional requirements imposed by the equal protection clause. Many 
details still need to be filled in, however, before anyone can reasonably 
claim that the constitutional boundaries of affirmative action have 
been clearly set. 
II. CROSON AS FACT AND SYMBOL 
The most striking features about the factual setting of the contro-
versy in Croson are the uncanny mixture of the familiar and the unex-
pected, the clashing juxtaposition of traditional and emerging symbols, 
and the retelling of a familiar tale with disruptive additions that are 
difficult to integrate or comprehend. At the core of the Croson contro-
versy is the minority set-aside provision of the Richmond municipal 
public works contract ordinance. In Justice Marshall's words, that 
provision is "indistinguishable in all meaningful respects"70 from the 
congressionally mandated set-aside upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Fullilove. 71 Unlike the population of the United States or the member-
ship of Congress, which are comprised of a large majority of whites, 
however, Richmond's population is fifty percent black, and its City 
Council, which enacted the controverted set-aside provision, was com-
posed at all relevant times of five black and four white members.72 
The six minority groups identified by the Richmond set-aside provi-
sions for preferences were exactly the same as the ones favored by the 
federal set-aside at issue in Fullilove: · Blacks, the Spanish-speaking, 
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. 73 Ironically, however, as the 
Court was quick to point out, there is no evidence that Richmond ever 
had an Eskimo or Aleut citizen.74 Therefore, by borrowing a judi-
cially approved federal formula without apparent regard for relevant 
differences in context, the Richmond City Council opened itself up to 
the charge that its preferential set-asides could not be deemed legiti-
mately remedial even in the broadest sense of the term. 
70. 109 S. Ct. 706, 739 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
71. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Leaving federalism issues aside, the only significant difference be-
tween the two plans was that in Croson there was a 30% set-aside, while in Fullilove the set-aside 
was only 10%. See Croson,· 109 S. Ct. at 713; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454. However, in Fullilove 
the relevant minority population represented between 15% and 18% of the total population, see 
448 U.S. at 459, while in Croson it represented 50%, see 109 S. Ct. at 722. 
72. 109 S. Ct. at 722. 
73. 109 S. Ct. at 713. 
74. 109 S. Ct. at 728. 
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As the "cradle of the Old Confederacy,"75 Richmond stands as a 
symbol of the sad history of slavery, racial discrimination, and segre-
gation that cast blacks as inferiors and systematically deprived them of 
the most basic rights and benefits enjoyed by whites. Moreover, as 
Justice Marshall recounts, Richmond unfortunately typifies through 
its "disgraceful recent history"76 the massive official resistance against 
the extension of basic civil rights to blacks in the wake of the Brown v. 
Board of Education decision. 77 Well into the last decade, Richmond 
stood as a vivid epitome of the stubborn persistence of racial 
"apartheid"78 in all too many municipalities throughout the United 
States. Through the official acts of its governing officials, Richmond, 
among other things, deliberately diluted the voting rights of its black 
residents, mounted stiff hurdles against school desegregation, and 
sanctioned pervasive housing discrimination. 79 
Juxtaposed to this all-too-negative picture of Richmond, however, 
is a much more positive and hopeful one of more recent vintage. Not 
only have blacks now come to share political power with whites in 
Richmond, but members of both races have "joined hands" to deal 
constructively with controversial matters.8° For example, since 1975, 
Richmond has outlawed discrimination by the city and by private par-
ties in the award and performance of public contracts. 81 Thus, the 
Croson controversy is embedded in a sequence of events marking the 
transition between two eras. 
This is not to say that Richmond has achieved racial equality. The 
construction industry in particular had been particularly resistant to 
racial integration, with minorities virtually completely left out. 82 This 
phenomenon, however, was not unique to Richmond. The construc-
tion industry had been notorious in its exclusion of blacks on both a 
statewide and a nationwide basis. 83 The problem in Richmond was 
therefore both similar to, and part of, a much broader national prob-
lem. Not surprisingly, the solution sought by Richmond was along 
the same lines as that adopted earlier by Congress. 
While Richmond's 1975 outlawing of discrimination in public con-
tracts removed formal barriers to participation by minorities, it did 
75. 109 S. Ct. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
76. 109 S. Ct. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
78. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
79. 109 S. Ct. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
80. 109 S. Ct. at 753 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
81. 109 S. Ct. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
82. 109 S. Ct. at 714. 
83. 109 S. Ct. at 714. 
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not bring about racial integration in the city's construction industry. 84 
In 1983, when Richmond enacted its ordinance mandating the prefer-
ential set-asides, the city's population was 50% black, but only 0.67% 
of its prime construction contracts had been awarded to MBEs in the 
five years preceding adoption of the ordinance. 85 Against this back-
ground, the city enacted an affirmative action plan ("the Plan") re-
quiring contractors awarded city construction contracts to 
subcontract a minimum of 30% of the total dollar amount of each 
contract to MBEs. 86 
The Plan was supposed to be "remedial" in natur~ and was en-
acted "for the purpose of promoting wider participation by minority 
business enterprises in the construction of public projects."87 Adop-
tion of the Plan came after a public hearing, at which a member of the 
City Council testified to widespread "race discrimination arid exclu-
sion on the basis of race"88 in the construction industry. In addition, 
participants at the hearing introduced the statistics concerning the dis-
parity between Richmond's black population and the number of city 
contracts awarded to MBEs, and noted the virtually complete lack of 
MBE membership in local construction trade associations. 89 
There was bitter disagreement between the majority and the dis-
sent in Croson over whether direct evidence of race discrimination by 
the city or by prime contractors relating to public construction con-
tracts had been presented at the hearing preceding adoption of the 
plan. Justice O'Connor, speaking for the majority, stated that no di-
rect evidence of discrimination against minority subcontractors had 
been presented at the hearing, and implied that the reason for the very 
low percentage of MBEs engaged in public construction projects was 
'that MBEs were just not available.90 Writing in dissent, Justice Mar-
shall, on the other hand, found that the evidence introduced at the 
hearing provided a "strong," "firm," and "unquestionably legitimate" 
basis for the Richmond City Council's conclusion that "the effects of 
past discrimination warranted a remedial and prophylactic govern-
mental response."91 Moreover, Justice Marshall was sharply critical 
of the majority's assessment. In his own words, "to suggest that the. 
facts on which Richmond has relied do not provide a sound basis for 
84. 109 S. Ct. at 726. 
85. 109 S. Ct. at 714. 
86. 109 S. Ct. at 712-13. 
87. 109 S. Ct. at 713 (quoting Richmond, Va., City Code § 12-158(a)). 
88. 109 S. Ct. at 714 (quoting statement of Councilperson Marsh). 
89. 109 S. Ct. at 714. 
90. See 109 S. Ct. at 714. 
91. 109 S. Ct. at 746 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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its finding of past racial discrimination simply blinks credibility."92 
That the Plan was genuinely intended to be remedial seems obvi-
ous from its limited duration (five years) and from the fact that it was 
not renewed upon its expiration in June 1988,93 a full six months 
before the Supreme Court issued its decision in the case. It is thus 
ironic that this important affirmative action decision - which finally 
saw a majority on the Court agree upon a constitutional standard to be 
employed in the judicial assessment of race-based preferential treat-
ment, and which was characterized by the dissenting Justices as "a 
deliberate and giant step backward in this Court's affirmative action 
jurisprudence"94 - should settle a dispute over a defunct plan.95 Per-
haps this fact, more than any other, is indicative of the essential acon-
textual approach that characterizes the Croson decision. 
III. THE LOOSE CONSTRUCTION OF STRICT SCRUTINY 
Superficially, Croson 's contribution to the constitutional jurispru-
dence of affirmative action seems to be simple and clear: for the first 
time a majority of Justices on the Court agreed that race-based prefer-
ential treatment can be justified under the equal protection clause only 
if it meets the strict scrutiny test. Upon more probing consideration, 
however, the picture that emerges is anything but clear. First, 
although six of the Justices found the Plan to be unconstitutional, only 
five agreed that the strict scrutiny test provided the correct judicial 
standard. 96 Of those five, moreover, only four - a mere plurality -
agreed on what would satisfy strict scrutiny in the context of race-
based affirmative action: that is, compensation to actual victims of 
past discrimination, even if not undertaken by the actual wrong-
doer(s). 97 The fifth Justice in this group, Justice Scalia, had a more 
narrow conception of strict scrutiny and argued that it would only be 
satisfied when compensation is undertaken by actual wrongdoers.98 
The dissenting Justices rejected adoption of the strict scrutiny test 
92. 109 S. Ct. at 746 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
93. 109 S. Ct. at 713. 
94. 109 S. Ct. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
95. Although the Plan was defunct, the controversy, as the Court points out, was not moot. 
Croson was seeking damages for not having been awarded a public construction contract which, 
as the only bidder, it would have obtained but for its failure to comply with the Plan's set-aside 
provisions. See 109 S. Ct. at 713. 
96. Justice Stevens joined the majority's holding but did not embrace the strict scrutiny test. 
Indeed, Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion appears to rely on an intermediate scrutiny standard. 
See 109 S. Ct. at 732-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the Court must look 
at characteristics of advantaged and disadvantaged classes that may justify disparate treatment). 
97. See 109 S. Ct. at 729. 
98. 109 S. Ct. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
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in favor of the more lenient intermediate scrutiny test.99 They also 
noted that, in prior affirmative action cases, the Justices disagreed on 
the appropriate standard of review but always took a practical ap-
proach.100 Finally, notwithstanding their contention that the strict 
scrutiny test "is strict in theory but fatal in fact," 101 the dissenters 
sought to demonstrate that, contrary to the majority's conclusions, the 
Plan involved in Croson met even the requirements of strict 
scrutiny.102 
Notwithstanding their disagreements on several other matters, all 
nine Justices seem to agree in Croson on the proper conception of con-
stitutional equality at the highest levels of abstraction. They all be-
lieve that the equal protection clause is designed to uphold the equal 
worth, dignity, and respect of every individual regardless of race.103 
Moreover, in spite of their differences on the legitimacy of color-con-
scious means, all the Justices share the notion that the ultimate fulfill-
ment of constitutional equality lies in the establishment of a truly 
color-bli'1d society. 104 Also, several Justices reiterate that it is a cen-
tral purpose of the equal protection clause to constitutionalize the 
principle of equality of opportunity. 105 Yet for all these points of con-
vergence, the disagreements concerning the proper constitutional stan-
dard by which to assess affirmative action evince a failure on the part 
of all the Justices to make necessary connections between different 
levels of abstraction, and to promote a' satisfactory resolution of the 
continuing split over the two conflicting judicial positions articulated 
in Bakke. 
A. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Opinion 
Because of Justice Scalia's refusal to join her opinion on this point, 
Justice O'Connor's views on strict scrutiny are only shared by a plu-
rality of Justices. Her analysis is firmly anchored in the marginal 
equality position articulated in Bakke. 106 Justice O'Connor focuses on 
99. 109 S. Ct. at 743 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
100. 109 S. Ct. at 745 (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
101. 109 S. Ct. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 
448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
102. See infra text accompanying notes 148-53. 
103. 109 S. Ct. 706, at 720-21 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); at 730 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); at 736-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); and at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
104. See, e.g., 109 S. Ct. at 727 (asserting the American "dream of a Nation of equal citizens 
where race is irrelevant to personal opportunities and achievement ... "); at 735 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
105. See, e.g., 109 S. Ct. at 7~0-21 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); at 730 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
106. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-320. 
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equal treatment and on classifications rather than classes because she 
believes that racial classifications cause stigmatic harm, perpetrate no-
tions of racial inferiority, and serve the aims of racial politics.107 Ac-
cordingly, ill Justice O'Connor's view, the purpose of strict scrutiny is 
to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of racial classifications by assuring 
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool. 108 She further argues that even if a 
governmental objective is clearly compelling, unless there is a tight 
"fit" between means and ends, it is impossible to rule out the possibil-
ity that the classification was motivated by racial prejudice or 
stereotype. 109 
Justice O'Connor specifies that race-based affirmative action can 
meet the strict scrutiny test if it is "remedial" in nature. 110 A remedial 
race-based affirmative action plan serves a compelling state interest if 
it is compensatory in nature, and if it is properly circumscribed to 
benefit only actual victims of discrimination. 111 Such a plan need not, 
however, be carried out by a wrongdoer in order to remain constitu-
tional 112 so long as a nonwrongdoer assumes a duty of compensation 
voluntarily. 
Although theoretically defensible, Justice O'Connor's conception 
differs from that of Justice Powell in Bakke, 113 on whom she relies as a 
proponent of equal treatment, 114 and from that expressed in his plural-
ity opinion in Wygant, 115 which she joined. In his opinions in Bakke 
and Wygant, Justice Powell stresses that in order to be constitutionally 
permissible, compensatory affirmative action must be dispensed by a 
wrongdoer. 116 If it is provided by a wrongdoer, however, compensa-
tory affirmative action does not cease being constitutional if its benefits 
extend beyond "actual" victims of racial discrimination.117 Accord-
ingly, it appears that in Bakke Justice Powell equates constitutional 
compensatory affirmative action with the paradigm case of compensa-
tory justice, 118 while in Wygant he equates it with a model that differs 
107. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721. 
108. 109 S. Ct. at 721. 
109. 109 S. Ct. at 721. 
110. 109 S. Ct. at 721. 
111. 109 S. Ct. at 727-28. 
112. 109 S. Ct. at 729. 
113. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-320 (1978). 
114. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298). 
115. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-77 (1986). 
116. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-77; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-09. 
117. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78. 
118. See supra note 37. 
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from the paradigm on the side of the victim but not on that of the 
wrongdoer. In short, the two opinions by Justice Powell in Bakke and 
Wygant and Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson yield three different 
models of constitutionally permissible compensatory affirmative 
action. 
Although all three models are predicated on adoption of the mar-
ginal equality position announced in Bakke, they cannot be reconciled 
or comprehensively evaluated on the basis of the conception of consti-
tutional equality that emerges from the Supreme Court's affirmative 
action decisions. All three models implicitly acknowledge the validity 
of limited departures from equal treatment, but it is not clear whether 
the particular departure associated with any one of the three models is 
more consistent with the governing principle of equal treatment. On 
the other hand, the more general tenets of constitutional equality in-
voked by the Court - such as the principles of equal worth of each 
person and of equality of opportunity - have not received sufficient 
judicial elaboration to provide much guidance. Indeed, in the ab-
stract, these tenets are arguably as consistent with equal treatment as 
with substantially unequal treatment in the pursuit of certain equali-
ties of result. 119 Therefore, from the perspective reflected in Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in Croson, no principled determination can be 
made between compelling and noncompelling compensatory affirma-
tive action, because of the lack of a sufficiently developed conception 
of substantive constitutional equality. 
Embracing a much broader conception of what counts as "reme-
dial," Justice O'Connor asserts that a city like Richmond has a com-
pelling interest in preventing the expenditure of its tax dollars in 
furtherance of private racial discrimination: 
[I]f the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive partici-
pant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local 
construction industry, we think it clear that the city could take affirma-
tive steps to dismantle such a system. It is beyond dispute that any pub-
lic entity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that 
public dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not 
serve to finance the evil of private prejudice. 120 
Thus, if the construction industry is dominated by white-owned busi-
119. For an argument that the unequal treatment of whites disadvantaged by affirmative 
action is consistent with equal respect and concern for all, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 
227-29. Moreover, achieving equality of opportunity may require equal treatment - e.g., pro-
viding the same education to all - or unequal treatment - e.g., providing special remedial 
education to those who are educationally disadvantaged - depending on one's conception of 
equal opportunity. Cf D. RAE, supra note 31, at 74-75 (distinguishing between marginal and 
global equality of opportunity). 
120. 109 S. Ct. at 720. 
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nesses that systematically refuse to deal with MBEs or to hire black 
candidates for employment, then a municipality would have a compel-
ling interest in instituting a set-aside provision reserving some of its 
public construction contract work for MBEs. 
This latest compelling state interest is in a broad sense "remedial," 
in that it is designed to rectify the effects of objectionable past or pres-
ent private practices. Unlike the previous compelling interest ad-
vanced by Justice O'Connor and discussed above, however, the 
interest now under consideration relates to a distributive rather than a 
compensatory use of affirmative action. Indeed, on the assumption 
that public authorities have had no hand in the institution and mainte-
nance of private racially discriminatory practices in the construction 
industry, the government would have no compensatory duty toward 
any of the victims of such private discrimination. Furthermore, insti-
tution of the set-aside would not lead to exaction of compensation 
from the private wrongdoers, in the sense of divesting them from un-
just gains already realized or forcing them to make any of their victims 
"whole." Nor would such a set-aside necessarily serve to compensate 
actual victims of private discrimination, because it presumably draws 
no distinction between victim and nonvictim MBEs. On the other 
hand, through implementation of the set-aside, the government would 
prevent the use of public funds in furtherance of a private scheme in 
the construction industry designed to prevent minorities from receiv-
ing any significant share of the available construction business. 
Although distributive in nature, the compelling state interest in not 
having public funds used to further private racial discrimination is not 
purely forward-looking. It aims to thwart the derivation of future dis-
tributive benefits traceable to the exploitation of advantages gained by 
past wrongdoing. Under ordinary circumstances, and in the absence 
of any discriminatory practices, public construction work would be 
awarded exclusively on the basis of competitive bidding. Such bid-
ding, moreover, would be justified under the principle of equality of 
opportunity. To the extent that private discriminatory practices result 
in the systematic exclusion of MBEs from public construction con-
tracting and subcontracting work, however, adherence to formal 
equality of opportunity121 would only serve to perpetuate the unfair 
121. Formal equality of opportunity is understood here as a negative obligation by the state 
not to interfere with private market mechanisms. If one assumes that equal protection constitu-
tionalizes formal equality of opportunity, then the state has no obligation to eradicate the effects 
of systematic private discrimination so long as it stays out of the marketplace. However, once 
the state enters the marketplace through the award of public contracts, it arguably assumes the 
additional obligation to see to it that its participation does not directly serve to bolster the effects 
of private discrimination. For the difference between "formal" and "fair" equality of opportu-
nity, see infra note 213. 
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advantage secured through racial exclusion. Therefore, to cancel out 
the distributive advantages gained through private discrimination, 
public authorities would have to institute, at least temporarily, a 
means of distribution of public construction contract work that does 
riot depend exclusively on the implementation of the principle of (for-
mal) equality of opportunity. 
Justice O'Connor's opinion does not furnish a theoretical nexus 
between her relatively narrow conception of constitutionally permissi-
ble compensatory affirmative action and her relatively broad concep-
tion of constitutionally permissible distributive affirmative action. At 
a practical level, however, those two conceptions are linked inasmuch 
as they both condition the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative ac-
tion on the existence of past or ongoing racial discrimination. There-
fore, consistent with Justice O'Connor's analysis, whether it is 
compensatory or distributive, affirmative action can only be constitu-
tional if it is "necessary" to remedy wrongs caused by past -or ongoing 
discrimination. 
In the course of her arguments that the Plan is unconstitutional, 
Justice O'Connor frequently shifts from assertions that there is insuffi-
cient evidence of discrimination to justify Richmond's claimed reme-
dial interests, 122 to statements that affirmative action is not necessary 
because of the availability of alternative race-neutral remedial 
means. 123 Moreover, a close reading of her opinion reveals ambigu-
ities concerning whether certain types of acknowledged discrimina-
tion, such as "societal discrimination," are insufficient per se or 
whether they may be sufficient to create a compelling state remedial 
interest, but are simply too "amorphous" to establish the race-con-
scious remedy as genuinely "necessary."124 Also, as I will more fully 
examine below, Justice O'Connor imposes a very stringent standard 
for the establishment of the proper nexus between discrimination and 
resulting injury. 125 She requires that the links between discrimination 
and its effects be tightly and directly drawn, and appears to go to great 
lengths to present a series of events, which would ordinarily be viewed 
as being related, as though they were utterly disconnected. Finally, 
Justice O'Connor suggests that affirmative action cannot be a "neces-
sary" remedy if some race-neutral alternative is available, but she is 
less clear about what kind of race-neutral remedy might properly be 
122. See 109 S. Ct. at 724, 730. 
123. See 109 S. Ct. at 728-29. 
124. 109 S. Ct. at 723-24 (paraphrasing, in part,_Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. 
at 307). 
125. See infra text accompanying notes 165-72., 
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considered as a legitimate alternative.126 Must the race neutral alter-
native be as effective and as speedy as the proposed race-conscious 
remedy? Or, is it sufficient that the race-neutral alternative provides a 
remedy, albeit a slower and less effective one? 
Justice O'Connor's opinion fails to provide an overall framework 
that would reconcile her vision of what makes race-based affirmative 
action a necessary means toward a compelling state end with some 
coherent vision of constitutional equality. Her conception of strict 
scrutiny as articulated in Croson leaves many important questions un-
answered. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's refusal to uphold the consti-
tutionality of the Plan seems at odds with her relatively broad 
tolerance of distributive affirmative action. Actually, she only man-
ages to reconcile the two by combining an exceptionally stringent 
causal requirement with a completely abstract and acontextual grasp 
of the relevant facts. 
Finally, there is yet another factor which Justice O'Connor consid-
ers in connection with her application of the strict scrutiny test in 
Croson but which she fails to integrate satisfactorily with the other 
relevant factors discussed above. This factor is the harmful effect 
which the Plan seems likely to produce on white-owned enterprises 
competing to obtain public contracts. In Justice O'Connor's view, the 
Plan's set-aside denies whites the opportunity to compete for a fixed 
percentage of public contract dollars "based solely upon their race,"127 
and thus implicates their individual rights to treatment with equal dig-
nity and respect. 128 That alone, according to Justice O'Connor, re-
quires that the Plan be subjected to strict scrutiny.129 
Besides stressing that the above factor should trigger strict scru-
tiny, Justice O'Connor does not give it any further consideration in 
her assessment of the constitutionality of the Plan. In particular, she 
does not indicate whether depriving whites of the opportunity to com-
pete for a set percentage of public contract work taken alone would 
suffice to invalidate an otherwise constitutional affirmative action plan, 
or what importance it should have when considered in light of other 
relevant factors. Moreover, she does not refer to the Court's consider-
ation of this issue in Fullilove, 130 or to Justice Powell's suggestion in 
126. 109 S. Ct. at 728-29. Justice O'Connor does offer a list of possible race-neutral means of 
aiding disadvantaged businesses "in the absence of evidence of discrimination," 109 S. Ct. at 729, 
but it is not clear that these would obviate the need for more direct, race-conscious remedies 
where past discrimination could be shown. 
127. 109 S. Ct. at 721. 
128. 109 S. Ct. at 721. 
129. 109 S. Ct. at 721. 
130. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
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that case that the burden of a set-aside on whites should be weighed 
against the benefits derived from it. 131 Strictly speaking, since Justice 
O'Connor found the Richmond Plan constitutionally wanting on other 
grounds, there was no need for her to articulate a position on this 
issue. Nevertheless, in the absence of any guidance on the subject, it is 
impossible to draw a full picture of the constitutional constraints im-
posed on affirmative action from the standpoint of the position ex-
pressed by Justice O'Connor in Croson. 
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion 
Justice Scalia's conception of what strict scrutiny requires in the 
context of race-based affirmative action differs substantially from that 
of Justice O'Connor.132 Of all the Justices, Justice Scalia comes clos-
est to adopting the principle that the Constitution is color-blind, but 
stops short of that assertion by recognizing the legitimacy of two nar-
rowly drawn color-conscious practices. First, he asserts that race-con-
scious classifications are constitutionally permissible if they are 
necessary to save life or limb. 133 Second, he is willing to accept race-
conscious classifications if they fit the paradigm case of compensatory 
justice - that is, if they are necessary for an actual public wrongdoer 
to compensate its actual victims. 134 
The principle that all legal classifications must be color-blind pos-
sesses three major virtues. First, it is very easy to implement and does 
not require the elaboration of any complicated theoretical apparatus to 
determine the nature and scope of its proper application. Second, jus-
tification of the color-blind principle could rest entirely on the moral 
axiom that it is wrong for public authorities to draw any distinctions 
on the basis of race. This would obviate the need to delve at any depth 
into the divisive realm of substantive equality. Third, it provides an 
effective means of assuring the prohibition of racial classifications that 
inure to the disadvantage of oppressed racial minorities. 
For all its virtues, however, the color-blind principle is too blunt, 
and therefore, in spite of his obvious attraction to it, Justice Scalia 
feels compelled to admit that the scope of constitutional equality ex-
tends beyond it. Strict confinement to color-blindness would preclude 
the use of race-conscious policies even for the limited purpose of com-
pensating actual victims of official breache~ of the color-blind princi-
ple. In this way, strict adherence to the color-blind principle is 
131. 448 U.S. at 514-15. 
132. See 109 S. Ct. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
133. 109 S. Ct. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
134. 109 S. Ct. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
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incompatible with the Supreme Court's endorsement of color-con-
scious remedies in a long line of school desegregation cases. 135 
Once . one ventures beyond the color-blind principle, however, it 
becomes impossible to stake out a coherent position on the nature and 
scope of consitutional equality without relying on some fairly devel-
oped conception of substantive equality. Thus, to maintain that con-
stitutional equality permits some particular deviations from the color-
blind principle, but not others, one must be prepared to back her claim 
by drawing principled distinctions between justified and unjustified de-
viations. As the discussion of Justice O'Connor's opinion suggests, 
such distinytions cannot be expected to emerge from the mere applica-
tion of the strict scrutiny test. Indeed, both Justices O'Connor and 
Scalia apply the strict scrutiny test in Croson and yet Justice O'Connor 
finds constitutionally permissible far broader deviations from the 
color-blind standard than does Justice Scalia. Furthermore, the opin-
ions of both Justices provide glimpses of their respective conceptions 
of substantive constitutional equality and reveal a fairly similar stress 
on the equal worth, dignity, and respect of each individual and adop-
tion of the marginal equality position articulated in Bakke. How then, 
from apparently similar conceptions of substantive equality, can they 
be led to different conclusions concerning the amount of deviation 
from color-blindness that may be constitutionally tolerated consistent 
with strict scrutiny? 
One possible answer is that neither of their conceptions of substan-
tive equality is sufficiently developed to permit a precise delimitation 
of the permissible deviations. Thus, both Justices could agree on the 
broad outlines of a conception of substantive equality, but certain 
unarticulated differences concerning more concrete aspects of their re-
spective conceptions could well lead them to divergent views of what 
strict scrutiny requires. In any event, what is clear is that Justice 
Scalia, like Justice O'Connor, does not offer a sufficiently elaborated 
vision of substantive equality to circumscribe a strict scrutiny test that 
is stable, predictable, and reliable. 
C. Justice Marshall's Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting Justices, for their part, embrace the global equality 
position articulated in Bakke and reject the propriety of subjecting ra-
cial classifications favoring blacks to the strict scrutiny test. 136 Unlike 
the Justices who joined Justice O'Connor's opinion and in contrast to 
135. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) . 
. 136. 109 S. Ct. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia, the dissenting Justices believe that constitutional equal-
ity is compatible with unequal treatment (or marginal inequality) if 
such treatment is likely to promote certain kinds of equality of result 
(or global equality), and if such unequal treatment can be justified on 
broadly remedial, rather than exclusiv~ly distributive, grounds. 137 
The dissenting justices advocate adoption of the intermediate scrutiny 
test in the context pf affirmative action favoring blacks, 138 but at the 
same time lay stress on the importance of pursuing a practical ap-
proach.139 Finally, while Justice Marshall's opinion criticizes the ma-
jority's embrace . of the strict scrutiny test, he nonetheless offers a 
d~monstration that the Richmond Plan, placed in its proper historical, 
social, and political context, does satisfy the requirements imposed by 
that test. 140 
The asymmetry between racial classifications that disfavor blacks 
and those that disfavor whites underlies a powerful doctrinal argu-
ment made by Justice Marshall against the application of strict scru-
tiny to race-based affirmative action plans. Based on an equal 
protection jurisprudence developed _in cases not involving affirmative 
action, the Court has concluded that racial classifications must be sub-
mitted to the strict scrutiny test, 141 while gender-based classifications 
must be assessed according to the less stringent intermediate scrutiny 
test. 142 Thus, racial classifications are more suspect than gender-based 
ones, on the ground that the former are more likely to be invidious 
than the latter. So long as one focuses on classifications rather than on 
classes, as the Croson majority does, it follows that race-based affirma-
tive action must satisfy the strict scrutiny test . to· be constitutional, 
whereas gender-based affirmative action should be entitled to constitu-
tional approval if it satisfies the significantly less stringent require-
ments of intermediate scrutiny.143 Assuming that the injuries suffered 
by American blacks on account of race are at least as severe as those 
experienced by American women on account of gender, however, 
137. See 109 S. Ct. at 756 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
138. 109 S. Ct. at 743 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
139. 109 S. Ct. at 745 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
140. See infra text accompanying notes 148-54. 
141. See supra note 16. 
142. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
143. Since the only gender-based affirmative action case decided by the Supreme Court arose 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act rather than the equal protection clause, the Court 
did not have occasion to prescribe which constitutional standard should apply when preferential 
treatment is undertaken for the benefit of women. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa 
Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Nevertheless, there is every reason to expect that the 
Court would not apply a stricter standard of scrutiny for affirmative action programs that favor 
women than it would for other gender-based classifications favoring either men or women. 
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there is no justification for making it substantially more difficult to 
remedy wrongs perpetrated against blacks than those inflicted on 
women. 
Justice Marshall offers another, perhaps more important, argu-
ment for adopting the intermediate scrutiny test in race-based affirma-
tive action cases. Whatever the theoretical boundaries of strict 
scrutiny, in practice it is likely always to be fatal when applied by its 
proponents to race-based affirmative action plans. 144 It is true that the 
Plan in Croson may be reasonably interpreted as actually satisfying the 
strict scrutiny test and that nothing inherent in that test compels the 
conclusion that race-based affirmative plans are almost without excep-
tion unconstitutional. Yet, as Justice Marshall's opinion reveals, shift-
ing from strict to intermediate scrutiny may be important primarily as 
a way of reducing the number of obstacles that might be raised against 
remedial affirmative action plans. 145 
From a theoretical standpoint, the intermediate scrutiny test is as 
objectionable as the strict scrutiny test146 - a point which seems to 
have been anticipated by Justice Marshall, and which may account for 
both his stress on a practical approach and for his analysis suggesting 
that the Plan satisfies strict scrutiny. Indeed, intermediate scrutiny 
lacks determinate boundaries just as strict scrutiny does. Without a 
more elaborate conception of substantive equality than that put forth 
by the proponents of intermediate scrutiny, it is impossible to provide 
a coherent explanation for certain key distinctions. For example, one 
would be hard pressed to justify, without further reference to particu-
lar canons of substantive equality, why remedial affirmative action 
plans designed to ameliorate the present effects of past discrimination 
should satisfy intermediate scrutiny, but purely forward-looking dis-
tributive plans would not. 147 To sustain the distinction, one would 
have to demonstrate that the former serves an "important" state inter-
est, whereas the latter does not. But without sufficiently elaborated 
144. 109 S. Ct. at 752-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
145. Although both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are amorphous, and have no 
precise boundaries, strict scrutiny is nevertheless relatively more restrictive than intermediate 
scrutiny. Thus, if a particular kind of affirmative action plan has been approved under strict 
scrutiny, then a fortiori it would be legitimate under intermediate scrutiny. On the other hand, if 
a plan has been rejected under strict scrutiny, its proponents might still have a reasonable hope of 
getting it approved under intermediate scrutiny. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. 
147. This is apparently the position of the Brennan group in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356-62 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), and of the dissenters in 
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 752-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Justice Stevens' dissent in Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-20 (1986) (purely forward-looking race-based affirma-
tive action plan designed to promote minority teachers as role models permissible under equal 
protection clause). 
June 1989] Decoding Richmond 1759 
normative criteria indicating what makes a state interest important, no 
such demonstration is likely to be forthcoming. 
According to Justice Marshall's assessment, the Plan in Croson 
clearly satisfies the strict scrutiny test. In his view, Richmond can 
advance two compelling interests for enacting the Plan. The first is 
the city's interest in "eradicating the effects of past racial discrimina-
tion."148 Even assuming that racial discrimination in Richmond is a 
thing of the past, the city still has, in Justice Marshall's judgment, a 
compelling interest to remove "barriers to competitive access, which 
had their roots in racial and ethnic discriminations, and which con-
tinue today."149 In other words, so long as equality of opportunity is 
not fully realized in the competition for public works construction 
contracts due to lingering effects of past discrimination, Richmond has 
a compelling interest to intervene in that competition, through affirm-
ative action if necessary, in order to level the field of competition. 
Furthermore, in this context, preferential treatment of blacks who are 
not "actual" victims of racial discrimination would be justified as a 
"necessary" means to end disproportionate opportunities for success 
deriving ultimately from past racist practices. Therefore, preferential 
treatment of nonvictims, which Justice O'Connor consi~ers to be inad-
missible under strict scrutiny, satisfies Justice Marshall's interpreta-
tion of that test. 150 
The second compelling interest singled out by Justice Marshall in 
Croson is also considered compelling by Justice O'Connor. This is 
Richmond's interest in preventing city funds from being spent in ways 
that reinforce and perpetuate the effects of private discriminatory 
practices in the public works construction industry. 151 In spite of their 
agreement that this interest is compelling, Justices O'Connor and 
Marshall are led to opposite conclusions largely on the basis of their 
respective assessments of the relevant facts and circumstances present 
in Croson. As far as Justice Marshall is concerned, this is not surpris-
ing since he believes that Justice O'Connor and the other Justices who 
joined her opinion merely pay "lip service" to the importance of the 
city interest involved. 152 But even if one takes Justice O'Connor's 
statements at face value, the divergence between her conclusions and 
those of Justice Marshall canoe readily accounted for in terms of the 
148. 109 S. Ct. at 743 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
149. 109 S. Ct. at 74344 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448. U.S. 
448, 478 (1980)). 
150. See 109 S. Ct. at 754-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
151. 109 S. Ct. at 744 (Marshall, J., dissenting); at 720 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
152. 109 S. Ct. at 744 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
1760 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1729 
inherent indeterminacy of the strict scrutiny test, and in terms of the 
different conceptions that the two Justices have concerning the kind of 
causal link that must be established between discrimination, injury, 
and remedy in order to satisfy strict scrutiny. 
Unlike Justice O'Connor, Justice Marshall does discuss the impact 
of the Plan on innocent nonminority businesses. In his view, this im-
pact is minimal, since although the set-aside affects thirty percent of 
the public contracting dollars, that represents only three percent of the 
total contracting dollars in the Richmond area. 153 Relying on the 
Court's decision in Fullilove, Justice Marshall concludes that exclusion 
from the competition for three percent of the available contracting op-
portunities imposes only a "relatively light," and hence constitutional, 
burden on nonminority businesses.154 Furthermore, although Justice 
Marshall himself does not make this point, his conclusion is supported 
by the balancing test proposed by Justice Powell in Fullilove. 155 In-
deed, it seems fair to conclude that the benefits derived from eliminat-
ing the detrimental effects of systematic past racial discrimination in 
the construction industry and from preventing the expenditure of pub-
lic funds to promote and perpetuate the effects of private discrimina-
tion in that industry outweigh the burdens imposed on nonminority 
businesses by the three percent reduction in their overall contracting 
opportunities. 156 Nevertheless, neither the fact that the burden on 
nonminorities is relatively light nor the fact that this burden is accept-
able under a balancing test settles the issue of whether a racial quota 
can ever be consistent with the protection of the equal-worth and 
equal-respect rights of those whom it disadvantages. And nothing in 
the intermediate or strict scrutiny tests, or in any of the positions 
taken by Justice Marshall in Croson offers sufficient guidance on how 
this issue might be satisfactorily resolved consistent with legitimate 
notions of constitutional equality. 157 Accordingly, like Justice 
153. 109 S. Ct. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
154. 109 S. Ct. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
155. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
156. See 109 S. Ct. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
157. In contrast to Justice Marshall, Justice Scalia doe.snot believe that the burden imposed 
on nonminority businesses is constitutionally permissible. According to Justice Scalia, all quotas, 
even "benign" ones, are unconstitutional because they violate the sense of equal worth and dig-
nity of those adversely affected by them. 109 S. Ct. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
(quoting in part BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975)). Accordingly, for Justice Scalia, 
the fact that a quota imposes only light burdens or generates benefits that clearly outweigh its 
burdens cannot make it any more palatable. 
Justice Scalia is a proponent of the marginal equality position, whereas Justice Marshall sub-
scribes to the global equality position, but that alone does not explain their opposing views on the 
constitutionality of racial quotas. Indeed, Justice Powell, an architect of the marginal equality 
position, is also the original proponent of a balancing test to assess the impact of affirmative 
action on those who are disadvantaged by it. Furthermore, at the higher levels of abstraction, 
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O'Connor, Justice Marshall fails to provide a sufficiently detailed con-
ception of substantive equality to enable a principled and systematic 
justification for the positions he takes. 
In the last analysis, the majority's adoption of the strict scrutiny 
test as the applicable standard by which to determine the constitution-
ality of race-based affirmative action does not introduce any significant 
new measure of clarity or stability to the confusing status of preferen-
tial treatment plans under the equal protection clause. As we have 
seen, besides being inherently indeterminate, strict scrutiny means dif-
ferent things to different Justices, and there is no majority agreement 
in Croson on what it requires. Nevertheless, all the conceptions of 
strict scrutiny elaborated in Croson share the following least common 
denominator: to satisfy the strict scrutiny test, it is necessary to estab-
lish a causal nexus between past or ongoing racial discrimination and a 
resulting present injury or disadvantage. As we shall see, however, 
acceptance of this proposition does not mean that the Justices share a 
common understanding on its principal constituent terms. 
IV .. DISCONNECTING FACT, CAUSE, AND CONTEXT BY BLURRING 
THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF DISCRIMINATION 
In contrast to their disagreements concerning the applicable con-
stitutional standard and how that standard may be met, the Justices in 
Croson do agree on the principal facts. Yet, paradoxically, the bitter 
split between the Court's majority and the dissenters ultimately re-
volves more around the proper interpretation of commonly accepted 
facts than around disputes concerning constitutional doctrine. Indeed, 
acceptance of the same principal facts leads to diametrically opposed 
conclusions concerning the meaning and existence of compensable dis-
crimination, the causal links between such discrimination and a com-
pensable injury or disadvantage, and suitable remedies to redress the 
injury or eliminate the disadvantage. Moreover, these opposite con-
clusions are traceable to reliance on contrasting modes of interpreta-
tion. The first of these - to which I will refer as the atomistic mode 
of interpretation - is a more discrete mechanical mode of interpreta-
tion, relying on the disconnection of facts from the context in which 
they are embedded, and on the recombination of such disconnected 
facts into mechanistic causal chains made up of direct and linear links. 
there seems to be complete agreement between Justices Marshall and Scalia concerning the re-
quirements of prescriptive constitutional equality: they both believe in the dignity and equal 
worth of each person. See 109 S. Ct. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); and at 756 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Accordingly, it appears that neither of the two has form1,1lated a suffi-
ciently comprehensive conception of substantive equality to justify his respective position on the 
ci>nstitutionality of racial quotas. 
1762 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1729 
The second mode of interpretation - which I will refer to as the eco-
logical mode of interpretation - is more holistic and systemic in na-
ture, approaching social facts and events in terms of the interaction 
between individuals, groups, and their social, political, and historical 
environment. Moreover, under an ecological mode of interpretation, 
causal relationships need not be direct or linear. Instead, they may be 
indirect and multifaceted as they are shaped by the historical sequence 
of adaptations and disruptions that characterize the interactions be-
tween human actors and their intersubjective environment. 
The contrast between these two modes of interpretation is particu-
larly usefui in the context of Croson because it helps explain the sharp 
division between the Court's majority and the dissenters concerning 
the key issues of racial discrimination and its relation to the dispropor-
tionately small number of MBEs awarded public construction con-
tracting work. The majority's emphasis on "amorphous" societal 
discrimination, 158 and the supposed absence of an unbroken direct 
causal link between such discrimination and the infinitesimally small 
, number of MBEs engaged in public construction contracting work, 159 
clearly exemplifies the atomistic mode of interpretation. In contrast, 
the dissent's focus on the voluminous historical record of official dis-
crimination 160 and on the interrelationship between numerous race-
conscious and seemingly race-neutral practices, 161 avails itself of the 
ecological mode of interpretation. 
Justice O'Connor, following a line of reasoning going back to Jus-
tice Powell's opinion in Bakke, concludes that race-based affirmative 
action cannot be constitutionally justified as a remedy for societal dis-
crimination.162 Societal discrimination, which Justice O'Connor (like 
Justice Powell before her) characterizes as "amorphous," may connote 
something sporadic, erratic, and diffuse - something that leaves no 
clearly demarcated traces and produces no readily ascertainable direct 
effects. Actually, however, what Justice O'Connor and other Justices 
on the Court refer to as "societal discrimination" may be pervasive 
and systematic. For example, in Justice Powell's interpretation of the 
relevant facts in Bakke, the state medical school whose preferential 
admissions plan was at issue had not itself discriminated against mi-
nority applicants. 163 Nevertheless, many of its minority applicants 
158. 109 S. Ct. at 722-23. 
159. 109 S. Ct. at 723-26. 
160. 109 S. Ct. at 740-43, 746 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
161. 109 S. Ct. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
162. See 109 S. Ct. at 727; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
163. See 438 U.S. at 300-02. 
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presumably had been the victims of systematic, officially perpetrated 
or officially condoned racial discrimination by having been compelled 
to attend inferior, racially segregated public schools.164 
Racial discrimination in admissions by the medical school against 
a specified number of minority applicants who would have been ac-
cepted but for such discrimination would constitute the kind of factual 
occurrence that can be disconnected from its broader social and his-
torical context, and directly linked to a specific, clearly defined and 
readily compensable injury. It is not necessary to understand a 
broader sweep of social history to be able to see that a manifest harm 
has been effected and that a remedy is justified. On the other hand, 
racial discrimination at the elementary and secondary school levels 
cannot be so clearly or directly linked to the failure of a candidate to 
gain admission to a medical school that does not itself discriminate on 
the basis of race. In the latter case, it is not necessarily true that but 
for the inferior, segregated education received in public school, the 
rejected applicant would have gained admission. Indeed, not everyone 
who receives a superior public school education eventually gains ad-
mission to medical school, and there are a multitude of possible inter-
vening causes from the time of high school graduation that might 
explain the applicant's ultimate rejection from medical school. Ac-
cordingly, even after isolating the facts of a candidate's segregated 
public school education and of her rejection from medical school, it 
appears very unlikely that anyone could establish a clear or direct un-
broken causal link between the two, without more evidence to support 
the connection. 
Viewing the matter from the standpoint of the atomistic mode of 
interpretation, as does Justice O'Connor, it is even more difficult in the 
factual setting of Croson to extract any direct causal links than in that 
of Bakke. Unlike the state medical school involved in Bakke, the City 
of Richmond had been itself guilty of massive and systematic racial 
discrimination in education, housing, and the granting of the 
franchise. 165 In addition - and this fact seems particularly important 
since Richmond's public construction projects involve the expenditure 
of public funds in ways that benefit the construction industry - pri-
vate racial discrimination in the construction industry has been ram-
pant and pervasive nationwide, resulting in the virtually complete 
exclusion of black laborers from construction trade unions, and of 
black entrepreneurs from construction trade associations. 166 Yet, 
164. See 438 U.S. at 362-66. 
165. 109 S. Ct. at 748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
166. 109 S. Ct. at 714. 
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although Justice O'Connor acknowledges "the sorry history of both 
private and public discrimination in this country,"167 she then reduces 
it in Richmond's case to the label "societal discrimination," which in 
her view does not warrant imposing a "rigid racial quota" in the 
award of public construction contracts. 168 
Justice O'Connor's conclusion seems amply justified in accordance 
with the canons of atomistic interpretation. This is because two differ-
ent sets of relevant factual considerations conceivably lead to a break 
in the mechanistic causal chain that otherwise would directly link the 
admitted "sorry history" of discrimination to the virtually complete 
lack of MBEs in public construction contract work in Richmond prior 
to the institution of the Plan. The first of these factual considerations 
relates to the enactment in 1975 by Richmond of a city ordinance 
prohibiting "both discrimination in the award of public contracts and 
employment discrimination by public contractors,"169 and to the lack 
of evidence concerning violations of this ordinance.170 When these 
two facts are singled out and presented alongside Richmond's prior 
systematic racial discrimination, they can be viewed as raising signifi-
cant doubts about whether the gross racial imbalance in Richmond's 
public construction industry existing on the eve of the Plan is directly 
traceable to pre-1975 racial discrimination by the City. 
The second set of relevant factual considerations relates to the 
existence of non-racial factors that may account for MBEs' lack of 
success in the competition for Richmond's public construction con-
tracts. Among these non-racial factors, Justice O'Connor mentions 
"deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding require-
ments, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, and disability caused by 
an insufficient track record," all of which she believes are likely to 
affect anyone seeking to establish a new business, regardless of race. 17 1 
Finally, moving beyond these specific factors which serve to cast doubt 
on the existence of direct links between past racial discrimination and 
current racial imbalance in public construction, Justice O'Connor 
speculates that perhaps today's imbalance may be due ultimately to 
black entrepreneurs' disproportionate attraction to industries other 
than construction. 172 In short, Justice O'Connor appears to discon-
nect salient occurrences from one another and from the broader con-
167. 109 S. Ct. at 724. 
168. 109 S. Ct. at 724. 
169. 109 S. Ct. at 726 n.3. 
170. 109 S. Ct. at 726 n.3. 
171. 109 S. Ct. at 724. 
172. 109 ·s. Ct. at 726. 
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text in which they emerge, and to accept the existence of causal links 
between such occurrences only if every other plausible alternative has 
been conclusively ruled out. 
In contrast to Justice O'Connor, Justice Marshall adopts the eco-
logical mode of interpretation, and reaches diametrically opposed con-
clusions concerning discrimination, its effects, and. the need for 
affirmative action. For him, racial discrimination is not merely the 
product of certain separable and clearly definable acts with fully cir-
cumscribed and readily recognizable effects. Instead, when placed in 
its proper context, discrimination, according to Justice Marshall, 
"takes a myriad of 'ingenious and pervasive forms.' " 173 From his per-
spective, the evidence of racial discrimination in Croson is so over-
whelming that the Court's majority is not simply wrong, but stubborn 
in its refusal to see things as they are: 
The majority . . ·. takes the disingenuous approach of disaggregating 
Richmond's local evidence, attacking it piecemeal, and thereby conclud-
ing that no single piece of evidence adduced by the city, "standing 
alone" ... suffices to prove past discrimination. But items of evidence do 
not, of course, "stan[d] alone" or exist in alien juxtaposition; they neces-
sarily work together, reinforcing or contradicting each other. 174 
Whether it is ultimately fair to characterize the majority as "disingen-
uous" depends at least in part on the possibility of justifying the use of 
the atomistic mode of interpretation in the context of a case like 
Croson. But before that issue can be properly addressed, it is neces-
sary to focus briefly on the meaning that the facts in Croson take under 
the ecological mode of interpretation. 
From the standpoint of Justice Marshall's contextual approach, 
the juxtaposition of Richmond's massive pre-1975 official racial 
discrimination, of the systematic nationwide and local private discrim-
ination in the construction industry, of Richmond's 1975 antidis-
crimination ordinance, and of the fact that by 1983 only 0.67% of the 
city's public construction contracting work went to MBEs clearly 
points to the conclusion that the present-day racial imbalance is the 
effect of past (and present) invidious discrimination. Indeed, when 
placed in its proper historical context, Richmond's 1975 race-neutral 
antidiscrimination ordinance does not break the causal chain that 
leads from past systematic discrimination to subsequent grossly dis-
proportionate racial imbalance in the construction industry. Instead, 
the antidiscrimination ordinance has the effect of largely freezing the 
173. 109 S. Ct. at 745 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
174. 109 S. Ct. at 746 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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racial imbalance attributable to the outlawed pre-1975 practices. 175 
While adherence to the ordinance may prevent the imbalance from 
worsening through further purposeful exclusion, it does nothing to 
rectify the imbalance as it stood in 1975. Thus, if - as is the case in 
Cro~on - construction trade associations have virtually no black 
members,t76 race-neutral public contracting practices alone are not 
likely to lead to an increase in MBE participation. That result might 
not seem unjust if the paltry minority representation among Rich-
mond's contractors were truly simply a matter of choice. But, when 
placed in context, the fact that only a disproportionately small number 
of blacks seek to join the construction industry, contrary to Justice 
O'Connor's suggestion,177 is not a matter of mere predilection. It is 
rather a reflection of the long experience of humiliation and rejection 
which has made blacks reluctant to enter what they justifiably perceive 
as a hostile environment. 
Justice Marshall also rejects Justice O'Connor's suggestion that 
since certain nonracial factors may have contributed to the failure of 
MBEs to obtain a greater proportion of Richmond's public construc-
tion contracts, available race-neutral remedies must be exhausted 
before turning to affirmative action. According to Justice Marshall, 
race-neutral remedies, such as loosening bonding requirements or sim-
plifying bidding procedures, have not lead to significant improvements 
for MBEs when used in the past. 178 Moreover, one might add, from a 
contextualist standpoint, that the seemingly race-neutral factors in-
voked by the Court remain so only when viewed in isolation. In the 
context of systematic racial discrimination, these factors take on an-
other light, as they are likely to exacerbate the relative disadvantages 
experienced by victims of racism. As an illustration, the inability of an 
entrepreneur to meet bonding requirements may not be unjust if it is 
the consequence of unwise past business practices on his part rather 
than of racial oppression. Accordingly, loosening bonding require-
ments for all enterprises instead of instituting a set-aside for the vic-
tims of racial oppression may be an overbroad remedy, providing a 
competitive windfall for certain nonminority entrepreneurs without 
placing the victims of racism in the competitive position in which they 
would have been absent discrimination. 
The atomistic and ecological modes of interpretation also lead to 
divergent outcomes in the probative value they attach to the statistical 
175. See 109 S. Ct. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
176. 109 S. Ct. at 714. 
177. 109 S. Ct. at 726. 
178. 109 S. Ct. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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disparity itself in Croson. The ratio of contracts awarded MBEs to the 
total black population in Richmond (0.67% to 50%) is certainly dra-
matic. Justice O'Connor argues, however, that since the performance 
of public construction contracting work requires specialized skills, the 
proper comparison is not to the general black population of Rich-
mond, but rather to the much smaller figure representing the total 
number of qualified MBEs in the metropolitan area. 179 For purposes 
of determining whether public contracts are awarded in a race-neutral 
manner, Justice O'Connor's choice of relevant statistics seems entirely 
appropriate. But if the issue is the broader one of gauging the continu-
ing impact of historically grounded racial discrimination on the pres-
ent structure of the construction industry, then Justice O'Connor's 
choice, as Justice Marshall argues, is inadequate. 180 Indeed, from th~ 
broader historical perspective espoused by Justice Marshall, it is per-
fectly legitimate to compare the 0.67% figure to that of the total black 
population in Richmond. 181 Actually, failure to do so would unjustifi-
ably ignore the fact that some blacks lack the requisite qualifications to 
become successful entrepreneurs in the construction industry precisely 
because they have been the victims of systematic, official racial dis-
crimination, and that some other blacks, who might have otherwise 
chosen a career in the construction industry, did not even seek entry 
into that industry because of its long history of racial hostility and 
oppression. 
Finally, the contrast between the two modes of interpretation casts 
a useful light on Justice Scalia's rejection of quotas as violative of the 
equal worth and dignity of individuals. In support of his conclusion 
that quotas are unconstitutional, Justice Scalia states that , , 
[t]he relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or Jews or Irish who 
were discriminated against, but that it was individual men and women, 
"created equal," who were discriminated against. And the relevant re-
solve is that that should never happen again. 182 
As an abstract proposition, and as the expression of a normative aspi-
ration, Justice Scalia's statement is certainly unexceptionable. , 
From the standpoint of the ecological mode of interpretation, how-
ever, Justice Scalia's statement is plainly inadequate because it is ahis-
torical and acontextual. He disconnects various instances of 
discrimination and assesses them from the perspective of the individ-
ual as moral subject. In so doing, he ignores that as a concrete histori-
179. 109 S. Ct, at 725. 
180. 109 S. Ct. at 747 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
181. 109 S. Ct. at 746-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
182. 109 S. Ct. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
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cal matter, the three types of discrimination to which he refers differ 
from one another in nature and scope. Thus, for example, if the racist 
portrays blacks as being lazy and irresponsible183 while the anti-Semite 
depicts Jews as cunning and dishonest, the concrete injuries of racism 
are likely to differ from those of anti-Semitism. To the extent that 
victims internalize and adopt the perspective of those who cast them 
as inferiors, 184 blacks and Jews are likely to have different attitudes 
toward education and employment. Racist stereotypes depict blacks 
as ill-suited to succeed in education and on the job. Anti-Semitic ste-
reotypes, however, do not at all suggest that Jews are similarly handi-
capped. On the contrary, in the anti-Semite's view, the Jew may 
appear to be particularly prone to succeed because driven by an insati-
able thirst for power and domination. Accordingly, what may be an 
adequate remedy for one may not be appropriate for the other. In 
short, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's firm stand, from the standpoint 
of the ecological mode of interpretation, quotas should not be rejected 
out of hand without inquiry into their potential as remedies for the 
specific injuries perpetrated by racism. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the differences 
between the two modes of interpretation in any systematic or compre-
hensive manner. For present purposes, it suffices to focus on a distin-
guishing feature of atomistic inquiry. By disconnecting salient events 
from the mass of daily occurrences and by requiring that recombina-
tions of these events be made only on the basis of mechanistic, linear, 
and direct causal chains, the atomistic mode of interpretation accom-
plishes the following: It privileges the extraordinary over the quotid-
ian ~nd imp?ses a very high threshold for proof of causal connection. 
Use of the atomistic mode of interpretation seems particularly ap-
propriate in settings in which there is a strong presumption that the 
flow of events conform with certain well-established norms and expec-
tations. In those settings, the principal focus of the law is likely to be 
on the extraordinary, on occurrences that stand out for failing to meet 
widely shared normative expectations. Moreover, insistence on the es-
tablishment of clear and direct causal links seems especially apt in sit-
uations in which the law is intended to impose responsibility on an 
actor for the occurrence of an extraordinary event only if there is a 
183. See Bayles, Reparations to Wronged Groups, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 304 (B. 
Gross ed. 1977); see also Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le· 
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1373 (1988). 
184. Cf Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
("[M)embers of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempt· 
ing to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority's nega-
tive attitudes towards the minority.''). 
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high degree of probability that, but for that actor's acts (or omissions), 
the extraordinary event would not have occurred. Criminal cases are 
therefore the paradigm for appropriate use of the atomistic mode of 
interpretation. 185 Indeed, criminal acts are considered extraordinary 
departures from the social norm, and criminal defendants are given 
the benefit of every reasonable doubt, because of the strong presump-
tion of conformity to legal norms, 186 and because of the disproportion-
ate distribution of power between the prosecuting state and the 
individual accused of a crime. Also, although cases involving inten-
tional torts depart somewhat from the paradigm, they are close 
enough to it - particularly with respect to the conduct of the 
tortfeasor and to the injurious consequences flowing from such con-
duct - to warrant use of the atomistic mode of interpretation. 
Certain affirmative action cases clearly seem to justify recourse to 
the atomistic mode of interpretation. These include most notably 
cases in which compensatory, court-ordered affirmative action is 
sought against an alleged wrongdoer and cases in which the imple-
mentation of an affirmative action plan is likely to upset significantly 
the legitimate rights of innocent third parties.187 Because Richmond 
set up its Plan voluntarily, the first concern was not present in the 
case. As for the second, although this is by no means as obvious, the 
Plan in Croson was arguably unlikely to have significantly upset the 
legitimate rights of nonminority businesses in the construction 
industry. 
185. Cf. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970): 
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by .a standard of pro~f 
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important 
in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that 
his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper 
fact[ ]finder of his guilt with utmost certainty. 
186. Cf. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged."). 
187. When the purpose of affirmative action is to remedy ongoing racial discrimination or to 
exact compensation from a wrongdoer, such as an organization that has systematically excluded 
minorities from hiring or promotion, see, e.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 
421, 445 (1986) (Title VII case involving a union's egregious past and ongoing racial discrimina-
tion where the Supreme Court upheld a court-ordered 29.3% minority membership goal), and 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (on similar facts, Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a promotions quota to be implemented by Alabama Public Service Depart-
ment), then it is obviously important not to saddle anyone but a proven wrongdoer with the 
onerous burdens that implementation of an affirmative action plan might require. Similarly, in 
the context of a sphere of activity where instances of racial discrimination have been few and far 
between, very few whites would be likely to liave benefited from such discrimination. Accord-
ingly, before imposing an affirmative action plan that might require the lay-off or termination of 
white employees to make room for minorities, special care should be taken to demonstrate that 
the plan does not impermissibly abridge their almost certainly valid distributive claims to their 
current positions: 
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This last point may seem at first counterintuitive. Customarily, it 
is inappropriate to disturb legitimate distributive rights to satisfy 
someone else's compensatory rights - thus, the torts maxim that, as 
between two innocent parties, a loss should lie where it falls. Assum-
ing, therefore, that the nonminority businesses which would have ob-
tained public construction contracts but for the set-aside were not 
themselves guilty of racial discrimination, it appears unjust to deny 
them their distributive right to such work in order to satisfy the com-
pensatory rights of the MBE class. Moreover, to the extent that indi-
vidual MBEs do not have to prove themselves to have been the 
"actual" victims of racial discrimination before being able to benefit 
from the set-aside, the compensatory rights of any such individual are 
at best uncertain. In an ideal case, compensation ought to put every-
one affected in the position in which she would have been but for the 
wrong necessitating that compensation. 188 Conversely, the more un-
certain it is that a person would really have been in a different position 
but for the wrong, the less justification there seems to be for disturbing 
existing patterns of distribution through the granting of compensation. 
Keeping this in mind, it is also important that the degree of uncer-
tainty concerning the validity of a compensatory right not be evalu-
ated in a vacuum. Rather, it should be measured against the degree of 
uncertainty that also exists concerning the validity of those distribu-
tive rights that would have to be upset in order to carry out the pro-
posed compensation. Given the massive official racial discrimination 
present in Richmond before 1975 and given the systematic and virtu-
ally complete exclusion of blacks from the construction industry, there 
is arguably a significant degree of uncertainty concerning the distribu-
tive rights claimed by white entrepreneurs in the construction indus-
try. Indeed, many of them would have lost public construction work 
over the years to MBE competitors had past discrimination not so ef-
fectively excluded them. 189 Therefore, even if they are individually in-
nocent of any racial discrimination, the white entrepreneurs' 
distributive rights are arguably as uncertain as the black entrepre-
188. See supra note 9. Putting wrongdoer and victim in the positions they would have been 
in but for the wrong is also required by Nozick's principle of rectification. See R. NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 152-53 (1974). For a discussion of a philosophical defense of 
affirmative action in accordance with Nozick's principle of rectification, see M. ROSENFELD, 
supra note 24, at ch. II. 
189. Generally, according to the operation of Nozick's principle of rectification, see R. 
NozrcK, supra note 188, the legitimacy of entitlement claims depends upon their pedigree. If a 
claim of entitlement is not confronted by any valid claim to rectification, then it is legitimate. 
Conversely, the greater the number of plausible claims to rectification that can be interposed 
against a claim to entitlement, the less certain it becomes that the latter is valid. For a more 
extensive discussion of this point, in the context of affirmative action, see M. ROSENFELD, supra 
note 24, at ch. III. 
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neurs' compensatory rights. If that were the case, there would no 
longer seem to be any powerful justification for affording greater rec-
ognition and protection to asserted distributive rights than to asserted 
compensatory rights. In sum, in a setting where there is substantial 
uncertainty as to the validity of asserted distributive claims, the biases 
against compensation built into the atomistic mode of interpretation 
can no longer - all other things remaining equal - be justified. 
If it is constitutionally legitimate for Richmond to do whatever is 
required to eradicate racial discrimination and its lingering effects in 
all public construction contracting work, then a strong argument can 
be made that recourse to the ecological mode of interpretation is am-
ply justified. The ecological mode of interpretation in this case would 
start from the observation that the effects of discrimination are multi-
ple, multifaceted, and often not readily discernible, and would proceed 
by carefully tracking their sinuous paths through the historical, social, 
and institutional practices that have shaped Richmond and its 'con-
struction industry. For example, while the abolition of officially sanc-
tioned racial discrimination marks an important turning point in the 
evolution of race relations, it does not abolish racism nor eliminate the 
unfair advantages and disadvantages that racism produces. Racism 
may go underground or take on another mantle, but, given the extent 
to which racism is embedded in our national psyche, i.9o it is likely to 
persist and even grow more pernicious as it becomes more difficult to 
identify. Moreover, even if racism itself abates, race-neutral antidis-
crimination laws may speak against racism while, at the same time, 
perpetuating the unjust gains and losses which racism has previously 
generated. None of this is likely to emerge, however, from considera-
tions of isolated or disconnected events. What is required to obtain an 
adequate picture that would make possible the discovery of suitable 
remedies is a more comprehensive contextual approach. This, in tum, 
is possible only through the ecological mode of interpretation.191 
190. See Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
191. Judicial recognition has been given to certain departures from the atomistic approach 
and from the constraints it imposes on what should count as sufficient proof. This is true, for 
example, in certain product liability cases. A notorious example is provided by the DES cases, in 
which plaintiffs sued drug companies for injuries they suffered as a consequence of their mothers' 
use of the drug DES during pregnancy. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140 (1980) (finding that plaintiffs had a cause of action even through they 
could not establish which particular manufacturer had produced the drugs consumed by their 
mothers): 
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology 
create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any spe-
cific producer. The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, 
denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these 
changing needs. 
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One who subscribes to the preceding assumption, and who never-
theless insists that atomistic interpretation should be used in a case 
like Croson, may justifiably be accused of being disingenuous. Indeed, 
in that case, it would seem that use of the atomistic mode of interpre-
tation would be purely strategic, for purposes of obfuscating important 
causal connections which would otherwise come to light. Conceding 
that all forms of racism and all its effects must be eliminated, and yet 
imposing onerous and unnecessary constraints on proofs of racism and 
its multiple effects, evinces at least some degree of bad faith. Further-
more, to the extent that this is a fair characterization of the majority's 
position in Croson, Justice Marshall's charge of disingenuity192 may 
well be warranted. 
On the other hand, if only a more narrowly compensatory project 
for combatting racism is considered constitutionally permissible, then 
Justice Marshall's charge of "disingenuity" would be unfair. Thus, for 
example, if one accepts Justice Scalia's position - that the Constitu-
tion should be color-blind except for compensation by an actual 
wrongdoer to his actual victim - then recourse to the atomistic mode 
of interpretation would seem perfectly justified. 
In the last analysis, in the context of a case like Croson, one may be 
strongly intuitively drawn to either of these two modes of interpreta-
tion, depending on whether one has a narrow or a broad conception of 
the responsibilities of the state with respect to racism. Moreover, the 
marginal equality position seems to go hand-in-hand with the atomis-
tic mode of interpretation, while the global equality position seems 
more compatible with the ecological mode of interpretation. 193 None-
theless, in the end, a principled decision concerning which mode of 
interpretation to embrace cannot be made without reference to a con-
ception of substantive equality. Thus, even the disagreements among 
the justices in Croson concerning facts and the inferences to be drawn 
from them cannot be resolved without the constitutionalization of a 
sufficiently elaborated conception of substantive equality. 
Id. at 144. 
In one sense, the situation in Croson is the opposite of that in Sindel/, where the victims were 
known but not the particular tort-feasor. In Croson, the alleged wrongdoers were identified but 
not their individual victims. Notwithstanding this and other differences, both cases share an 
important similarity. Unless a departure from the atomistic approach is permitted, patently mer· 
itorious claims would so remain without a remedy. 
192. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
193. Intuitively, it seems that a mechanical approach is more suitable to determining if a 
particular allocation was made through the distribution of equal portions or whether it complied 
with equal treatment than to determining if it produces global equality. For example, a purely 
mechanical approach is unlikely to indicate whether the same public education puts a black child 
from an urban ghetto in the same global position vis-a-vis the job market as a white middle-class 
child living in an affluent suburb. 
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V. CROSON AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, OR STANDING 
CAROLENE PRODUCTS ON ITS HEAD 
Justice O'Connor turns to yet another independent source to jus-
tify her conclusion that strict scrutiny is appropriate in Croson - the 
process-oriented approach that originated in Carolene Products' foot-
note four. 194 As already discussed, this approach, which posits as the 
governing norm a properly functioning democratic majoritarian polit-
ical process, cannot be coherently followed without at least implicit 
commitment to substantive norms. 195 Leaving this important point 
aside, however, I will, in this section, take the Carolene process ap-
proach at face value for purposes of demonstrating that Justice 
O'Connor's appropriation of it in the context of Croson fails on its own 
terms. 19 6 Moreover, as we shall see, this failure can be traced to the 
majority's oversight of a key asymmetry because of its tendency to 
decontextualize. 
John Ely, the foremost exponent of the process-oriented approach 
derived from Carolene, maintains that, in accordance with that ap-
proach, race-based affirmative action that favors blacks is constitution-
ally permissible. 197 Professor Ely's conclusion is based on the 
assumption that whites constitute the relevant political majority, and 
blacks a disfavored and isolated minority. 198 Since whites are in the 
majority, Professor Ely posits, any legislative decision that disadvan-
tages whites to the benefit of a minority group is unlikely to have been 
reached in a way that undermines the integrity of the majoritarian 
political process: 
When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so as 
to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being 
unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of 
review, are lacking. A White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself 
for reasons of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to 
underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those of others, 
or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative classification that 
would extend to certain Whites the advantages generally extended to 
194. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 722. 
195. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
196. Since I take the position that the Carotene approach cannot be followed without adher-
ence to substantive norms, what I mean by "on its own terms," is the following: I will assume 
that the Carotene approach is process-based although I know that certain substantive values are 
embedded in it. Thus, the substantive proposition that blacks constitute a "discrete and insular" 
group is deemed to be self-evident and many of its most obvious implications are deemed to be 
the subject of widespread consensus. As such, those substantive values can be relegated to .the 
background and·related process-based issues brought into the foreground. 
197. Ely, supra riote 55, at 727. 
198. Id. 
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Blacks. 199 
Relying on the facts that Richmond's population is fifty percent 
black and that the City Council that enacted the Plan had a five-to-
four black majority, Justice O'Connor concludes, based on her under-
standing of Professor Ely's theory, that strict scrutiny is warranted.200 
Since blacks hold a majority of seats on Richmond's City Council 
while not constituting a minority in that city, and since the Plan bene-
fits blacks at the expense of whites, Justice O'Connor reasons that the 
. situation in Croson is analogous to that of a case where a white major-
ity enacts a law that disfavors blacks.201 
Justice O'Connor's conclusion is erroneous, however, for two prin-
cipal reasons: first, the analogy she draws is not supported by the 
facts; and, second, more importantly, even if it were, it would be, valid 
only at a purely abstract and superficial level. 
It is true that blacks in Richmond are not a minority, but neither 
are they a majority. This latter fact, which Justice O'Connor appar-
ently overlooks, has important consequences from the standpoint of 
the Carolene process approach. Even assuming that all majority deci-
sions favoring the majority should be considered suspect - an as-
sumption which neither Carolene nor Professor Ely makes - it does 
not follow that a decision backed by the one half of the population that 
is favored by it should likewise be considered suspect. Indeed, so long 
as all members of society have a voice, one half of the population can-
not, consistent with the premises underlying the Carolene approach, 
use the majoritarian process to subjugate the other half. Furthermore, 
although there may be a majority of blacks on the City Council, the 
fact that there is no black majority in Richmond should serve as a 
powerful incentive for black Council members not to act with disre-
gard for the interests of one half of their constituents. In any event, 
the Richmond City Council's decision to adopt the Plan was not made 
strictly along racial lines. One white councilmember voted with the 
majority and another abstained.202 Moreover, given the one white 
vote in favor of the Plan, the Plan would have gone through even if 
one of the black councilmembers had been replaced by a white mem-
ber who would have voted against the Plan. If that had been the case, 
the Plan, consistent with Justice O'Connor's reasoning, would not 
have been suspect, because it would have been adopted by a Council 
with a white majority. Accordingly, to make the scrutiny of an affirm-
199. Id. at 735. 
200. 109 S. Ct. at 722. 
201. 109 S. Ct. at 722. 
202. 109 S. Ct. at 753 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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ative action plan tum on the racial composition of the governmental 
body that adopted it, without regard for the racial breakdown of the 
actual vote of approval, or of the electorate represented by that gov-
ernmental body, seems entirely arbitrary. Given the facts concerning 
the Richmond City Council's vote in favor of the Plan, there is no 
justification for simply equating that vote with that of an overwhelm-
ingly white legislature acting to disadvantage a group of blacks which 
is unmistakably in the minority. 
Even if the factual circumstances had been somewhat different -
say that blacks represented fifty-one percent of Richmond's popula-
tion, and the City Council had voted for the Plan strictly along racial 
lines - Justice O'Connor's conclusion would still be unwarranted 
under the Carolene standard. Under those circumstances, it is true 
that one could draw an abstract and rather superficial analogy to cases 
where white majorities have approved action that disadvantaged black 
minorities. Nevertheless, the analogy could not hold, if all the rele-
vant factors were taken into account, and events were placed in their 
proper social, political, and historical context. 
This last point, is best illustrated by reference to the "reversal 
test."203 According to this test, the legitimacy of a state of affairs re-
sulting from unequal treatment can be determined by imagining role 
switches among the individuals involved. Thus, by imagining that the 
blacks involved in a given affirmative action case are white and the 
whites involved black, the reversal test probes our intuitions about 
whether the race preferences are legitimate. One of the principal vir-
tues of the reversal test is its ability to weed out stereotypes and 
prejudices in the assessment of race-conscious policies. For example, a 
racist who sees nothing wrong about a law that disfavors blacks - say 
a law that conditions public employment on results in a racially biased 
written examination - might feel altogether different had the law in 
question been enacted by a black majority to the disadvantage of a 
white minority. 
Viewed in terms of the reversal test, Justice O'Connor's use of the 
Carolene approach to reach the conclusion that Richmond's Plan was 
suspect may, at first, seem justified. By taking the Plan and switching 
the respective places of whites and blacks, one obtains (on the slightly 
modified facts discussed above) an affirmative action plan favoring 
whites instituted by a governmental body comprised of a white major-
ity in a municipality with a white majority. Such a plan would consti-
tute a paradigm case calling for strict scrutiny under the Carolene 
203. The reversal test has been suggested as a means to determine the legitimacy of affirma-
tive action. See A. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 16 (1979). 
1776 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1729 
approach. Hence, the reversal test would suggest that the actual plan 
favoring blacks be similarly scrutinized. 
This application of the reversal test is adequate if blacks and whites 
are taken abstractly as two races standing outside the realm of history 
or politics. If the differences between blacks and whites relevant for 
purposes of assessing the legitimacy of unequal treatment are more 
than a mere matter of skin pigmentation, however, then the reversal 
test is superficial and misleading. To be meaningful, the reversal test 
must take these differences into account, entailing more than its simple 
hypothetical color switch, but also a switch in economic, political, and 
historical conditions, and a switch in attitudes, beliefs, and psychologi-
cal makeups. 
Based on a complete role switch204 - as opposed to the superficial 
one that underlies Justice O'Connor's analysis - the reversal test ap-
plied to Croson would yield something like the following. After centu-
ries of slavery and official racial discrimination by black-dominated 
government entities, the white citizens of Richmond who represent 
(according to a reversal of our modified facts) a bare majority of the 
city's population have enacted through the City Council (on which 
they have a majority of one) a temporary affirmative action plan favor-
ing them. Pursuant to that plan, whites are assured, for a limited pe-
riod of time, a certain proportion of the city's public construction 
contracting work, in the context of a national and local construction 
industry completely controlled by blacks and from which whites have 
been almost completely excluded because of racism. Although whites 
constitute a bare majority in Richmond, they are a minority at the 
state and national levels, and both their state legislature and the Con-
gress of the United States are comprised of an overwhelming majority 
of black legislators. Finally, the black-controlled Congress has en-
acted an affirmative action plan favoring whites in public construction 
contracting work at the national level, which is virtually identical to 
the Richmond plan, and which has served as a model for the local 
version. 
Should this affirmative action plan favoring whites be considered 
suspect under the Carolene approach? If one remembers that the pur-
pose of strict scrutiny under that approach is to protect "discrete and 
insular" minorities from abuses of the majoritarian process,205 a strong 
argument can be made that the blacks of our counterfactual example 
204. For a more extended discussion of the difference between a complete role switch and a 
partial role switch, and between a complete and a limited reversal of perspectives, see M. ROSEN· 
FELD, supra note 24, chs. III and IX. 
205. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
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are in no need of special protection because they are not a powerless 
minority that cannot get redress in the majoritarian process. Even if 
they were always to lose in local municipal politics - an unlikely pos-
sibility given their greater wealth, and their greater power and influ-
ence in the city's social and professional circles - they would still 
retain a high degree of leverage at the state and national levels where 
they are unquestionably dominant. Given their great advantages on 
the state and national scales, it seems ludicrous to think that they 
could be intimidated by the slim white majority in local politics. For 
these reasons, Richmond's imagined affirmative action plan favoring 
whites should not be subject to strict scrutiny under the Carolene ap-
proach. A complete reversal of roles, therefore, rather than the lim-
ited and abstract one that underlies Justice O'Connor's analysis, 
indicates that, when put in its proper context, the actual Richmond 
Plan should not be considered suspect under the Carolene based 
approach. 
VI. RECONTEXTUALIZING CROSON: SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
In the preceding sections, I have argued that the constitutionality 
of affirmative action in general, and of the Richmond Plan in particu-
lar, cannot be determined cogently through a process-based judicial 
approach and a decontextualized analysis. In this section, I suggest 
that a principled assessment of the constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion can be made only by reference to a sufficiently developed concep-
tion of substantive equality. Reliance broadly on substantive equality 
is unlikely to end the debate over the constitutionality of affirmative 
action, since equal protection is arguably compatible with more than 
one conception of substantive equality.206 A strong case can be made 
for the constitutionalization of one of those conceptions - equality of 
opportunity - but my principal concern here is not with arguing for 
one conception over another, so much as showing that explicit refer-
ence to some conception of substantive equality is essential to a coher-
ent analysis of affirmative action. To illustrate the usefulness of this 
approach, I will take a fresh look at the Croson case, this time evaluat-
ing it from a perspective informed by a commitment to equality of 
opportunity, one of several possible substantive conceptions of equal-
ity. In doing so, I am interested in shifting this debate from the decon-
textualized realm of process-based constitutional jurisprudence to the 
more concretely grounded realm in which actual social, political, and 
206. See supra note 64. 
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historical circumstances can be linked to specific conceptions of sub-
stantive equality. 
Neither in Croson nor in any of its other affirmative action deci-
sions does the Court provide a sufficient account of equal opportunity 
to indicate whether this conception of equality might justify the use of 
race-based affirmative action. Articulating a satisfactory account of 
equal opportunity is by no means simple. Indeed, while commitment 
to it is widespread, 207 determining what constitutes equal opportunity 
is complex and problematic.208 Accordingly, I will not attempt a com-
prehensive account of equality of opportunity, but only a sufficiently 
detailed picture of it to satisfy the requirements of the task at hand. 
Equality of opportunity leads to inequality of result,209 and can be 
justified when scarcity of some coveted good prevents the achievement 
of equality of result. 210 The allocation of public education, public em-
ployment, and public construction contracting work all involve scar-
city to the extent that demand for each of them exceeds supply. 
Because of this scarcity, one can justify requiring government alloca-
tions of these goods to be made according to the principle of equality 
of opportunity. 
As a substantive principle, equality of opportunity is prescriptive 
in nature.211 What it requires cannot be established with sufficient 
specificity, however, unless one has an adequate notion of equality of 
opportunity as a descriptive concept. From a descriptive standpoint, 
207. See D. RAE, supra note 31, at 64 (equality of opportunity is the most compelling ele· 
ment of our national ideology). 
208. See Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality And Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Ap· 
praisal. 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1698 (1986). 
209. See D. RAE, supra note 31, at 64 (equality of opportunity means that "(o]pportunities of 
power, right, and acquisition are to be equal; power, right and acquisition themselves are not"). 
210. By virtue of acceptance of the proposition that all individuals are of equal moral worth, 
arguably everyone's good faith claims to public goods ought to be satisfied. Accordingly, the 
achievement of equality of result with respect to such claims would seem prima facie to be mor-
ally justified. In case of scarcity, however, equality of result may only be possible by depriving 
everyone of the coveted public good. This would be the case if the scarce goods to be allocated 
could not be divided into a sufficient number of lots to provide each person who is morally 
entitled to it with an equal distribution. For example, if there are one hundred persons who 
deserve to obtain a particular kind of job, and only fifty such jobs are available, the only way to 
achieve equality of result would be by refraining from allocating any such job to any of the 
deserving persons involved. If that alternative is unacceptable, equality of opportunity provides 
the best means to ensure a just distribution of scarce public goods. 
A distribution that does not give all equally deserving claimants an equal share must, in the 
interests of justice, at least preserve an "equality of opportunity" .... 
. . . Resort to the concept of "quality of opportunity" is afaute de mieux procedure, a 
counsel of despair, as it were. It represents a means for achieving an equalization of oppor-
tunities (and risks) in cases in which a direct allocation of shares to claims is infeasible. 
N. RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE UTILITARIAN 
THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION 94 (1966). For a more extended discussion of the relation between 
equality of opportunity and equality of result, see M. ROSENFELD, supra note 24, ch. I. 
211. See supra note 210. 
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equal opportunity can either be "means-regarding" or "prospect-re-
garding."212 Moreover, a further distinction can be drawn between 
"formal" and "fair" means-regarding equality of opportunity.213 
Considerations of human dignity and efficiency militate against re-
quiring that state allocations of education, employment, and public 
construction work conform to prospect-regarding equality of opportu-
nity. 214 That leaves means-regarding equality of opportunity, and the 
question becomes whether constitutional equality should be under-
stood as requiring formal or fair means-regarding equality of opportu-
nity. So long as our focus remains on affirmative action, however, we 
need not resolve this question as the weaker requirement of formal 
equality of opportunity is sufficient to justify preferential treatment to 
remedy the present effects of past racial discrimination, and accord-
ingly to legitimate the Plan involved in Croson. 21s 
One of the significant advantages of formal equality of opportunity 
is that it imposes, in the first instance, only negative obligations on the 
state. Thus, if equal protection demands that Richmond adhere to 
formal means-regarding equality of opportunity in the allocation of 
public construction contracts, then the city must refrain from discrim-
inating against any business enterprise that seeks to compete for public 
construction work. Furthermore, to the extent that the prime contrac-
212. "Means-regarding" equality of opportunity refers to a situation where the competitors 
for a scarce good possess the same tools or instruments for obtaining the good they seek. See D. 
RAE, supra note 31, at 66. "Prospect-regarding" equality of opportunity, on the other hand, 
refers to a situation where all competitors for a scarce good have the same probability of ob-
taining that good. See id. at 65. 
213. Formal equality of opportunity has been defined as follows: "X and Y have equal op-
portunity in regard to A so long as neither faces a legal or quasi-legal barrier to achieving A the 
other does not face." R. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY 101 
(1980). By contrast, those who maintain that equality of opportunity requires in addition the 
elimination of all relevant differences directly attributable to inequalities in social conditions are 
proponents of "fair equality of opportunity." Cf J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73 (1971) 
(requiring that careers open to talent be supplemented by the principle of fair equality of oppor-
tunity, under which "those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances ... 
irrespective of the income class into which they are born"). For further discussion of the differ-
ence between formal and fair means-regarding equality of opportunity, see Rosenfeld, supra note 
208, at 1696-97. 
214. The achievement of prospect-regarding equality of opportunity would be contrary to the 
preservation of human dignity to the extent that equalization of probabilities of success would 
require depriving certain individuals of the use of means - e.g., abilities, skills, or talents - that 
they already possess. For example, if the objective is to equalize the probabilities of success at 
playing soccer, and one member of the group is permanently paralyzed from the waist down, 
then equality of prospects may, strictly speaking, require breaking the legs of the remaining 
members of the group. 
On the other hand, prospect-regarding equality of opportunity may interfere with efficiency if 
it is to be achieved through a lottery. Let us assume, for example, that awarding a scarce public 
job or contracting opportunity to the most qualified applicant would maximize efficiency. In that 
case, allocating the job or contract on the basis of a lottery would be in all likelihood inefficient. 
215. For a philosophically based argument in favor of the constitutionalization of fair means-
regarding equality of opportunity, see M. ROSENFELD, supra note 24, ch. X. 
1780 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1729 
tors who compete for city contracts themselves discriminate on the 
basis of race in the allocation of subcontracting work, the principle in 
question imposes on the city a further negative duty. That duty re-
quires the city not to spend its public monies in a way that directly 
aids and perpetuates private racial discrimination in the construction 
industry. 
Adoption for the future of a distributive system based on formal 
means-regarding equality of opportunity does not justify prospective-
looking affirmative action. Advocates of formal equality of opportu-
nity cannot legitimately tolerate any preferential treatment in the allo-
cation of scarce public goods, because any such preference would 
violate the prevailing principle of distribution. Indeed, if the govern-
mental allocation is to be carried out through a competition open to all 
who wish to obtain the scarce good, then the setting of preferences 
favoring some competitors over others would undermine the integrity 
of the means of distribution. 
Violations of the principle of equality of opportunity, however, 
may justify the compensatory use of affirmative action. Particularly if 
violations are systematic and prolonged, damages and the reinstate-
ment of formal means-regarding equality of opportunity may not ade-
quately compensate for past injuries or ensure the future integrity of 
the distributive system .. But to understand why this may be the case, it 
is necessary to look a little closer at the complex structure of means-
regarding equality of opportunity. 
Means-regarding equality of opportunity is, in effect, an equality 
wedged between two inequalities: inequality of initial circumstances 
and inequality of result.216 Moreover, if the allocation of a scarce 
good is determined through an open and unconstrained competition, 
the inequality of result to which this process is bound to lead - e.g., 
allocation of a scarce public job to one of a large number of competing 
applicants - is likely to be the product of the inequality of initial 
circumstances among the competitors. Thus, for example, if the rele-
vant competition consists in taking a test designed to measure mathe-
matical ability and learning, those applicants who possess the greatest 
talent for mathematics and who have obtained the most extensive 
training in that discipline are most likely to succeed and to earn the 
scarce good. In view of this, the difficult question is which of the ine-
qualities in initial circumstances must be removed in order to achieve 
means-regarding equality of opportunity. The range of plausible an-
swers spans the entire spectrum from none to all, since the determina-
216. See Rosenfeld, supra note 208, at 1698. 
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tion concerning which means ought to be equalized, and which ought 
to be left as found in the initial circumstances, is a function of particu-
lar theories of substantive equality.217 
There is a great advantage to limiting the state's equal protection 
obligation to the upholding of formal means-regarding equality of op-
portunity. Indeed, such an obligation does not impose on the state a 
burden to equalize any of the numerous inequalities likely to be en-
countered in any set of initial circumstances. All that the state must 
do is refrain from tampering with initial circumstances in a way that 
would alter the ratio of existing inequalities and affect the outcome of 
the competition. Moreover, while this view of equal protection does 
not impose any positive duty on the state to equalize the means pos-
sessed by would-be competitors, neither does it forbid the state from 
voluntarily undertaking to provide its citizens with additional tools 
which might be useful in the competition. Should the state choose to 
distribute additional tools, it would then be obligated to do so in a 
nondiscriminatory manner,218 for discrimination would amount to 
tampering with the initial circumstances in order to privilege certain 
competitors at the expense of others. 
For example, the state has no affirmative federal constitutional ob-
ligation to provide free public education to its citizens.219 Accord-
ingly, even though the possession of educational assets is an important 
factor in shaping the outcome of the competition for scarce public 
goods, the state's obligation is merely not to interfere with the private 
efforts of its citizens to obtain educational assets. Whatever inequali-
ties in the possession of educational assets may be produced (absent 
interference by the state) would be legitimate. However, if the state 
decided to make it illegal for blacks to obtain an education, the deficits 
in the possession of educational assets attributable to that state action 
would clearly be unacceptable.220 Similarly, if instead of forcibly 
preventing blacks from obtaining an education, the state granted free 
education· to whites but not to blacks, or provided blacks and whites 
inherently unequal educations, the resulting inequalities in educational 
assets would be just as objectionable as those resulting from the state's 
217. For example, disparities in economic wealth and social assets are compatible with a 
libertarian conception of equality of opportunity, cf R. Noz1cK, supra note 188, at 151 (explain-
ing entitlement principle of justice, whereby each person can freely use whatever assets she has 
legitimately acquired), but not with the contractarian conception articulated by Rawls, see J. 
RAWLS, supra note 213, at 73. 
218. Cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493- (1954) (state is not constitutionally 
obligated to provide free public education, but once it does, it "must [make that education] avail-
able to all on equal terms"). 
219. See 347 U.S. at 493. 
220. See 347 U.S. at 493. 
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outright prohibition of education for blacks. 221 In short, to the extent 
that equal protection constitutionalizes formal means-regarding equal-
ity of opportunity, the state has a duty of non-interference with the 
private acquisition of competitive assets, and should the state decide to 
undertake the public distribution of any such assets, it must make 
them available equally to all who wish to acquire them. 
We are now in a position to understand the nature of the injury 
caused by systematic and prolonged official racial discrimination in 
the context of a competition for scarce public goods. This injury con-
sists in the loss of assets capable of improving their holders' chances of 
success in the competition. The extent of this injury can be measured 
by the difference between the assets that an individual victim actually 
holds and those she would have possessed absent the violation of her 
formal means-regarding equal opportunity rights. 
Turning to Croson, the relevant assets likely to affect the outcome 
of an open competition for public construction contracting work in-
clude the following: educational assets; social assets, such as access to 
influential members of the community; professional assets, such as 
trade association membership; financial assets, such as the possession 
of sufficient working capital; and, finally, experience and know-how in 
running a construction business. Some of these assets may be capable 
of being acquired by an individual, given sufficient opportunity; others 
may take several generations to amass. 
Even without any discrimination whatsoever, any starting position 
(i.e., the competitive status an individual enjoys immediately preced-
ing the onset of a competition) seems bound to be riddled with in-
equalities in all of the relevant categories of assets. Such "natural" 
inequalities, however, do not call for corrective state action under the 
principle of compensation, which requires for its invocation the exist-
ence of an initial wrong. It is essential, therefore, under this model, to 
distinguish between inequalities traceable to state violations and those 
attributable to other causes. 
Further complicating the picture, the relevant assets are such that 
inequalities with respect to one may often produce further inequalities 
with respect to others. For example, the possession of educational as-
sets is often linked to the subsequent acquisition of professional assets 
and of economic wealth, so that marked inequalities in the possession 
of educational assets may lead to further inequalities in the possession 
of professional and economic assets. ·For the same reasons, inequali-
ties attributable to violations of equal opportunity rights are often 
221. See 347 U.S. at 493. 
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likely to generate further inequalities. Full compensation, therefore, 
must redress not only those inequalities found in the asset targeted by 
the initial violation, but also those inequalities caused by it in other 
assets as well. Thus, for example, even if state discrimination is con-
fined to the sphere of public education, the ripple effect of that dis-
crimination may well be the creation of additional inequalities in the 
economic and professional spheres. Accordingly, the task of making 
the victims of such discrimination whole would have to include re-
dress for the inequalities in the economic and professional spheres at-
tributable to original discrimination in education. 
To the extent that it is possible to make the victim of racial dis-
crimination whole by means of a distribution of additional assets, 
there would be no need for preferential treatment in the competition 
for public goods. 222 Often, however, that possibility does not exist. 
For example, it may simply take too long, perhaps more than a life-
time, to put a person who received an inferior racially segregated edu-
cation in the position she would have been in but for racial segregation 
in public education. Or, the "but for" proposition or counterfactual 
needed to fix the proper measure of compensation may be too specula-
tive to justify redress. Thus, for instance, not all those who receive an 
adequate public education amass fortunes, make the right professional 
contacts, or possess other qualities necessary for success in business. 
Accordingly, it seems purely speculative to assert that but for public 
school racial segregation any particular individual would have actually 
succeeded in business. 
In both kinds of cases described above, where a distribution of as-
sets is unlikely to provide a satisfactory remedy, affirmative action 
may well afford the best possible means of redress. In order to under-
stand how this might be, we must focus briefly on some elementary 
aspects of the relationship between means and prospects.223 In the 
broadest terms, it is obvious that an individual's prospects of success 
in a competition will depend on the relevant means which she has at 
her disposal. For example, if success in a competition depends on 
physical strength, then the physically stronger competitors have a bet-
ter prospect of winning the competition than their weaker counter-
parts. Likewise, if physical strength were the only factor that might 
222. Indeed, once such victims are provided with the assets that they would have possessed 
but for racial discrimination, they ought to compete for scarce public goods just as effectively as 
everyone else. Since, at that point, the effects of discrimination will presumably have been com· 
pletely eliminated, any preferential treatment would amount to unjustified tampering with equal 
opportunity, which might itself require a remedy. 
223. For a more extended discussion of the relationship between means and prospects, see D. 
RAE, supra note 31, at 74-75. 
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have a bearing on the outcome of a competition, then all those who 
possess equal physical strength would have equal prospects of success. 
Now, in any actual competition the relationship between means and 
prospects is likely to be more complex. In a competition conducted in 
accordance with the prin~iple of formal means-regarding equality of 
opportunity, there are likely to be substantial inequalities of means to 
which there would correspond substantial inequalities of prospects. 
These inequalities are legitimate under the applicable principle, and 
therefore give rise to no valid claim of compensation. However, ine-
qualities of means that are the product of violations of the applicable 
principle generate further inequalities of prospects which are not 
themselves justified. Accordingly, from the standpoint of the competi-
tion for scarce public goods, the injury caused by violations of the 
principle of formal means-regarding equality of opportunity is the di-
minished prospect of obtaining such a scarce good. 
Affirmative action in the form of a quota, such as the one at issue 
in Croson, seems perfectly suited to correct the reductions in prospects 
of success attributable to violations of formal equal opportunity rights. 
To illustrate this point, let us assume that as a consequence of a city's 
racist policies, its black citizens have been deprived of certain means, 
causing them to suffer a ten-percent loss in their prospects of success 
in the competition for scarce public goods. In that case, a racial quota 
that has the effect of raising their prospects of success by ten percent 
would clearly appear to be the best means to put them in the position 
in which they would have been but for past racial discrimination. Pro-
vided that the blacks involved are minimally qualified to handle the 
scarce public good which they seek to obtain,224 the quota's elimina-
tion of the unjust deficit in prospects of success is clearly preferable to 
the much more difficult process of making up directly for the corre-
sponding deficit in means through a distribution of relevant assets. On 
the other hand, a quota raises prospects but does not guarantee ulti-
mate success, 225 and therefore, unlike certain outright distributions of 
assets, a quota does not compensate for purely speculative harms.226 
224. Affirmative action programs resulting in the allocation of scarce public goods, such as 
jobs or construction contracts, to those who are not minimally qualified would not only be com-
pletely inefficient, but also self-defeating. Indeed, placing responsibilities on those who are in-
competent to handle them is hardly likely to contribute to their integration into the mainstream 
of society. Accordingly, affirmative action may only provide partial compensation, but that does 
not make it unjust. Those whom it cannot compensate should not be left without a remedy; they 
should be afforded a different, more suitable remedy. 
225. Provided, of course, that the number of minimally qualified members of the benefited 
class is greater than the number of places or positions sought to be allocated through the quota. 
226. Consistent with this analysis, one can meet a seemingly powerful criticism made against 
affirmative action. This criticism is that affirmative action benefits the most qualified members of 
the discriminated-against group, who presumably need help the least, at the expense of its least 
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Once this is understood, the objection against using affirmative ac-
tion as a remedy for societal discrimination loses most of its force. 
Indeed, what seems objectionable about granting a preference in em-
ployment to a victim of discrimination in education, for example, is 
that it is speculative to assume that but for the deprivation in educa-
tional assets the beneficiary of the preference would have secured the 
employment for which he is now competing. However, if the employ-
ment quota is properly perceived as awarding the job applicant the 
increased prospect of success that she would have enjoyed absent the 
discrimination in education, then the remedy does not appear to ex-
ceed the harm. 
Conceding that affirmative action is the best-suited means of com-
pensation for violations of formal means-regarding equal opportunity 
rights, there are still certain substantial objections that may be raised 
against it even from the perspective of those who are committed to the 
principle of equal opportunity. I shall deal briefly with the three most 
important among these objections: (1) that while affirmative action 
satisfies compensatory equal opportunity it violates distributive equal 
opportunity;227 (2) that while some kinds of affirmative action may be 
justified, race-based affirmative action is not, because it is both over-
and underinclusive;228 and (3) that notwithstanding its virtues, race-
based affirmative action violates the substantive equality rights of its 
"innocent" white victims.229 
As we have seen, purely forward-looking distributive application 
qualified members, who are presumably in the greatest need of assistance. See A. GOLDMAN, 
supra note 203, at 90-91. 
This criticism misses its mark because it fails to take into consideration that to be legiti-
mate, affirmative action must be parasitic on a distribution system based on ... equality of 
opportunity .... Equality of opportunity favors more talented and more qualified individu-
als at the expense of less qualified and less talented ones, and so does affirmative action. As 
a matter of fact, when equality of opportunity is the norm, discrimination causes propor-
tionately greater harm to its more talented victims, and, conversely, it has the effect of 
bestowing proportionately greater undeserved benefits on the least qualified members of the 
groups not subject to discrimination. In accordance with this, affirmative action tends to 
take away undeserved benefits from those who would not have received them absent dis-
crimination even as it tends to increase the prospects for receiving benefits of those who 
would have been the most likely to receive them had they not been the victims of 
discrimination. 
Rosenfeld, supra note 9, at 908. 
227. Cf. Fullinwider, On Preferential Hiring, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 210 (M. Vet-
terling-Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English eds. 1977) (assuming maximizing efficiency is the dis-
tributive objective of careers open to talents, preferential treatment works against the ends of 
distributive justice). 
228. See, e.g., A. GOLDMAN, supra 203, at 76 (not all blacks were unjustly denied jobs or 
education). · 
229. Id. at 103 (passive receipt of certain benefits attributable to past discrimination, which 
are thrust upon them by society, does not justify imposing a distributive share of collective guilt 
on innocent white males). 
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of the equal opportunity principle precludes the use of affirmative ac-
tion, while compensation for violations of the same principle may re-
quire it. Thus, we seem to reach an impasse: to compensate we must 
apparently violate our distributive rule whereas to adhere to the latter 
we may well be compelled to deny just compensation. There is, how-
ever, a way out of this dilemma. 23° Indeed, upon further considera-
tion, it becomes plain that unless provision for compensation is made 
for abridgements of distributive rights, those who are bent on violating 
such rights could eventually completely undermine legitimate distribu-
tive principles with impunity. To preserve the integrity of an estab-
lished distributive principle, therefore, it is necessary to give 
precedence to compensatory claims for violations of distributive rights 
under that principle, even if that entails a temporary suspension of the 
application of that distributive principle. Paradoxically, preservation 
of the integrity of a distributive system may require deviation from it. 
Consistent with this understanding of the proper nexus between 
compensatory and distributive concerns, affirmative action designed to 
remedy the present effects of past discrimination is predominantly 
compensatory, at least from the perspective of its beneficiaries.231 The 
purpose of such affirmative action is to compensate the victims of past 
discrimination for the reduction in their prospects of success attributa-
ble to violations of their equal opportunity rights. Moreover, since 
relative prospects of success come into play in the distributive arena, 
affirmative action operates on, and therefore has a direct effect on, the 
sphere of distribution. Nevertheless, affirmative action's predominant 
compensatory purpose in this context should not be obscured by its 
distributive effects. If affirmative action operates on the distributive 
sphere it is because that is where the relevant injuries caused by viola-
tions of equal opportunity rights become manifest. As conceived here, 
however, affirmative action is not meant to effect any permanent 
changes in distributive relationships, a fact evinced by the temporary 
nature of many affirmative action plans, including the one at stake in 
Croson. 232 Indeed, once discrimination is eliminated and preferential 
treatment has brought prospects to where they would have been ab-
sent discrimination, compensation will have been completed and there 
would be no further need for affirmative action. Accordingly, in the 
context of a theory of substantive equality that embraces the principle 
of formal means-regarding equality of opportunity, affirmative action 
230. This solution is proposed by Alan Goldman. See id. at 65-67. 
231. In other words, although affirmative action has a distributive effect on society at large, it 
remains compensatory from the perspective of its beneficiaries. 
232. 109 S. Ct. at 713. 
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can be justified as a means to compensate victims of racism for the 
present effects of past discrimination. 
The second broad objection can be summarized as follows: As-
suming that affirmative action is a legitimate compensatory tool, race-
based affirmative action is nonetheless objectionable because it is both 
over- and underinclusive. Not all blacks are "actual" victims of dis-
crimination and not all victims of discrimination are black. Accord-
ingly, race-based affirmative action provides unjust windfall benefits in 
the distributive sphere to blacks who were not confronted by "actual" 
discrimination, and leaves other nonminority victims uncompensated. 
This objection can be met with two arguments. The first rebuts the 
conclusion that race-based affirmative action is overinclusive; the sec-
ond argues that neither is it underinclusive. Race-based affirmative 
action is not overinclusive because all American blacks are likely to 
have suffered some deprivation resulting in a reduction in their pros-
pects of success which can be traced to the systematic and pervasive 
history of official racism throughout the United States in general, 233 
and in Richmond in particular.234 Moreover, even if a black individ-
ual has not been the "actual" victim of discrimination - in the sense 
of having been directly confronted by an official denial of formal equal 
opportunity because of her race - it is still highly probable that offi-
cial racism has deprived her of some asset she would have otherwise 
possessed, thus causing some reduction in her prospects of success. 
For example, the child of parents who were forced to attend inferior, 
racially segregated public schools is likely to be deprived of certain 
assets which she otherwise would have received from her parents, and, 
consequently, to suffer a reduction in her prospects of success. Also, 
the cumulative effect of the long history of systematic racial discrimi-
nation in education, housing, employment, trade unions, and trade as-
sociations in the construction industry, and in virtually every other 
sphere of social interaction, is likely to have a substantial negative im-
pact on the prospects of success of all blacks. 2 35 In other words, be-
cause of the ravaging effects of state-sponsored and -condoned racism, 
it seems fair to conclude that but for such racism, the prospects of 
success in the distributive arena of all American blacks would be sig-
nificantly higher than they are. 
233. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-402 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Maguire, The Triumph of Unequal Justice, 95 CHRIS-
TIAN CENTURY 882, 883-84 (1978) (blacks are treated as the lowest caste of society); cf A. 
GOLDMAN, supra note 203, at 187 (marked statistical differences between groups is strong evi-
dence of discrimination and of present lack of equality of opportunity). 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79, 82, 84 & 85. 
235. See supra note 233. 
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On the other hand, the reason why race-based affirmative action is 
not underinclusive is that, as already pointed out, the injuries of ra-
cism are different from those resulting from other forms of discrimina-
tion. 236 It is true that equal opportunity rights have been violated on 
the basis of gender, religion, and additional considerations other than 
race. Nevertheless, when placed in their proper context, the injuries 
attributable to racism are bound to differ significantly from those at:. 
tributable to sexism, anti-Semitism, or other bases of prejudice.237 As 
we have seen, the racist's stereotypes differ markedly from the anti-
Semite's with the consequence that the actual obstacles facing the vic-
tims of racism are not likely to be the same as those confronting those 
of anti-Semitism. And to the extent that violations of equal opportu-
nity rights of blacks attributable to racism lead to injuries that are 
different in nature and scope from those traceable to other kinds of 
negative group stereotyping, race-based affirmative action designed to 
redress unjust deficits in prospects due to racism should not be viewed 
as underinclusive.23s 
The third objection concerns the injuries that race-based affirma-
tive action is supposed to inflict upon "innocent" whites. Because of 
preferential treatment for blacks, certain whites who have never con-
sciously engaged in racial discrimination are harmed inasmuch as they 
are deprived of goods which they otherwise would have obtained. 
Thus, in the context of the Plan in Croson, several of the white entre-
preneurs who failed to obtain public construction subcontracting work 
would have undoubtedly been successful but for the thirty-percent set-
aside. The fact that "innocent" whites may be harmed by affirmative 
action, however, does not, standing alone, suffice as the basis for a 
constitutional violation. 239 But proponents of this objection assert 
that it is because of their race that certain "innocent" whites are made 
to bear a disproportionate share of the burden imposed by affirmative 
236. Cf. Bayles, supra note 183, at 305 (although race perhaps ought to be irrelevant to state 
conduct, being black can be made morally relevant derivatively by racism). 
237. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. 
238. This does not mean, however, that injuries to other groups should not be redressed, only 
that injuries to blacks are sufficiently distinguishable from other injuries attributable to discrimi-
nation and to negative group stereotyping. Thus, the justification of race-based affirmative action 
by no means precludes the justification of gender-based affirmative action, for example, given that 
sexism has led to a decrease in women's prospects of success in the competition for public goods. 
Accordingly, both race-based and gender-based affirmative action may be necessary to ensure the 
complete integrity of a distributive system based on formal means-regarding equality of 
opportunity. 
239. As Chief Justice Burger stated in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980): "It 
is not a constitutional defect in this [affirmative action] program that it may disappoint the expec-
tations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure 
the effects of prior discrimination, such 'a sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not 
impermissible." 
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action. And being harmed because of one's race seems indeed to 
amount to a constitutional wrong. 240 
To meet this objection, it must be demonstrated that compensatory 
race-based affirmative action does not violate the constitutionalized 
substantive equality rights of "innocent" whites - that is, consistent 
with our operative assumptions, their individual rights to equal dignity 
and respect and to formal means-regarding equality of opportunity. 
Focusing first on equal dignity and respect rights, there is, to be 
sure, a superficial analogy between the unequal treatment of blacks 
under racist policies and that of whites pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tion plan. When the two situations are placed in their proper context, 
however, it becomes apparent that they are fundamentally different. 
In the context of racism, a black candidate is truly denied an opportu-
nity to compete for a scarce public good because of her race. 241 In the 
context of affirmative action, on the other hand, a white candidate is 
not harmed because of his race, 242 but as the result of a design to elim-
inate the pJ.".esent effects of past discrimination. Racial discrimination 
is intended to degrade and demean its victims and to cast them as 
inferiors. Compensatory affirmative action, however, is not meant to 
deprive whites of equal respect.243 The intent behind racial discrimi-
nation is exclusionary while that behind compensatory affirmative ac-
tion is inclusionary,244 as it seeks to integrate the victims of racism 
into the mainstream of society. Furthermore, the effects of failure in 
the competition for scarce public goods are not likely to be the same 
for blacks and whites. Such a failure by a white is unlikely to lead to 
his being treated as a second-class citizen. 245 A similar failure by a 
black, however, is likely to perpetuate the stigma of racial stereotypes 
240. Cf Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S; 265, 298-99, 309-10 (1978) (Bakke, 
an innocent individual, was being asked because of his race to bear the brunt of redressing group 
grievances which were not of his making. Consistent with the equal protection clause, an indi-
vidual cannot be burdened for the benefit of a group unless this were to amount to a necessary 
means to a compelling state interest.). 
241. Cf 438 U.S. at 387-402 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (blacks 
are grossly under-represented in universities and the professions because of systematic 
discrimination). 
242. It may appear that the innocent white is burdened "because of" his race, but that is a 
misleading impression based on a superficial and acontextual comparison with the black victims 
of racial discrimination. The latter are harmed "because of" - i.e., for no other reason than -
their race. Strictly speaking, the innocent white, however, is harmed for no other reason than 
that the compensatory claims of the victims of racism take precedence over his distributive 
claims. 
243. See 438 U.S. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (whites 
are not stigmatized by preferential minority admissions program). 
244. The distinction between exclusionary and inclusionary uses of race, and the compatibil-
ity of the latter with equal worth and the equal protection clause is emphasized by Justice Stevens 
in his dissent in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316-17 (1986). 
245. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
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and to inhibit the achievement of genuine equal dignity and respect.246 
Ultimately, therefore, the burdens of compensatory affirmative action 
are not comparable to those of outright racial discrimination and do 
not deprive whites of equal respect.247 
Although- affirmative action treats whites unequally to blacks, it 
need not deprive them of any legitimate equal opportunity rights. 
Viewed from the proper contextual perspective, the only thing that 
affirmative action seems to take away from the "innocent" white per-
son is the increased prospects of success gained as a consequence of 
the racially discriminatory acts (or omissions) of the state. The reduc-
tion in the prospects of blacks attributable to official racial discrimina-
tion has already produced a windfall in the form of increased 
prospects of success for all the other competitors seeking to obtain 
scarce public goods. In this sense, affirmative action merely restores 
the equal-opportunity balance, placing both blacks and whites in the 
position in which formal means-regarding equality of opportunity 
would have left them absent official racial discrimination. Consistent 
with this, affirmative action designed to remedy the present effects of 
past discrimination does not take away from "innocent" whites any-
thing that they have rightfully earned, such as educational skills devel-
oped through hard work, and which they deserve to keep.248 Even if 
completely innocently acquired, the increased prospects of success 
gained through the unjust treatment of blacks are entirely undeserved. 
Thus, although the loss of these increased prospects may result in bit-
ter disappointment, it does not amount to a violation of any equal op-
portunity right. 
rhis analysis suggests that there is sound support for Justice Mar-
shall's position in Croson to the effect that affirmative action is consti-
tutionally pepnissible if used to remedy the present effects of past 
discrimination, or to prevent direct state subsidies from sustaining dis-
criminatory private distributive schemes. 249 A systematic and com-
(Bakke's rejection from medical school will not "affect him throughout his life the same way as 
the segregation of the Negro school children in Brown I would have affected them."). 
246. See 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
247. For a philosophical argument that a dialogical process involving a complete reversal of 
perspectives would lead to a consensus among blacks and whites that race-based affirmative ac-
tion to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination is compatible with equal respect and 
dignity for all, see M. ROSENFELD, supra note 24, chs. IX and X. 
248. Thus, affirmative action is not objectionable in the same way as the achievement of 
prospect-regarding equality of opportunity since it never requires depriving members of society 
of the use of natural assets or social assets acquired through perseverance and hard work. See 
supra note 214. 
249. Given the negative character of the duty imposed on the state by formal means-regard-
ing equality of opportunity, the state has no obligation to intervene to remedy private discrimina-
tion. However, ifthe state decides to intervene in the economical sphere, it cannot avoid lending 
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prehensive justification for Justice Marshall's position could be formed 
around a theory of substantive equality that promotes equal opportu-
nity and that possesses a sufficiently developed conception of it. More-
over, Justice Marshall's ecological mode of interpretation in Croson 250 
seems fully justified in light of the nature of the principle of formal 
means-regarding equality of opportunity and the far reaching probable 
effects of massive and pervasive violations of that principle. Justice 
O'Connor's atomistic mode of interpretation,251 on the other hand, is 
plainly inadequate to track down the unjustly diminished P.rOspects of 
success suffered by victims of racial discrimination. 
From the standpoint of the constitutionalization of formal means-
regarding equality of opportunity, Justice O'Connor's overly narrow 
compensatory approach in Croson - and, for that matter, Justice 
Scalia's - is even more fundamentally flawed. It is so restrictive that 
it does not allow for adequate compensation for violations of equal 
opportunity rights, and is thus incompatible with a state's voluntary 
efforts to reestablish or maintain the integrity of a distributiye system 
built on equal opportunity.252 Indeed, in the face of massive violations 
of equal opportunity rights with far-reaching effects such as those 
present in Croson, it will not do to limit compensation to isolated and 
well-defined violations that produce clear, distinct, and immediate in-
juries. Therefore, when closely examined in light of a sufficiently elab-
orated conception of substantive equality committed to the principle 
of equal opportunity, the respective positions articulated·by Justices 
O'Connor and Scalia seem not only inadequate but, in fundamental 
respects, squarely at odds with that principle. More generally, any 
purely backward-looking approach, or one that too narrowly confines 
its forward-looking focus to the plight of "actual" victims, cannot be 
justified as consistent with a comprehensive compensatory and distrib-
utive scheme committed to the principle of formal means-regarding 
equality of opportunity. To further that principle, affirmative action 
must be constitutionally permissible if it is both backward- and for-
support and sustaining private discrimination unless it intervenes in a way that tends to eradicate 
the effects of past private discrimination. By intervening in the economic sphere, the state does 
not assume any compensatory duty for private discrimination. But if the intervening state does 
nothing to eliminate the effects of private discrimination, it is bound to violate its distributive 
obligations. 
250. See supra text accompanying notes 173-81. 
251. See supra text accompanying notes 158-72. 
252. It is important to emphasize that the preceding analysis is limited to cases in which a 
government entity has voluntarily undertaken to set up an affirmative action plan. The present 
analysis does not address the question of whether a governmental wrongdoer can be forced, 
consistent with the Constitution, to implement an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate 
apparently remote and diffuse effects of that government entity's past racial discrimination. 
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ward-looking. It must be backward-looking to sort out past state-
sanctioned deprivations of means and consequent reductions in pros-
pects of success, from those for which the state bears no responsibil-
ity. 253 At the same time, it must be forward-looking, so that it can 
identify distorting consequences of past state discrimination, and to 
ensure that such consequences have not subsided to the point where 
raising the prospects of success fc;>r racial minorities through affirma-
tive action would subvert, rather than advance, distributive equal 
opportunity. 254 
Under the totality-of-circumstances approach suggested here as 
compatible with the constitutionalization of equal opportunity, Croson 
appears to 'be an easy case. Indeed, the combination of the city's long 
history of racial discrimination, of the virtual exclusion of blacks from 
the construction industry, and of the insignificant proportion of public 
construction. contracting work awarded to MBEs, points almost ines-
capably - particularly in light of the absence of any actual evidence 
to the contrary255 - to the conclusion that MBEs enjoyed lower pros-
pects of success than nonminority entrepreneurs, because of racially 
motivated violations of their equal opportunity rights. Other cases, 
undoubtedly, will be harder as the combination of relevant factors be-
comes more attenuated or diffuse. In Croson, for example, it was mere 
speculation for Justice O'Connor to assert that the virtual exclusion of 
blacks from the construction industry might have been the result of 
free career choices rather than the consequences of fierce, direct racial 
discrimination. 256 In another case, however, it is entirely plausible 
that a statistical disparity is as reasonably explained as a function of 
factors involving no violations of equal opportunity rights as it is a 
direct consequence of racism. And in such a case, since affirmative 
action would be no more likely to promote equal opportunity than to 
frustrate it, it would not be constitutionally justified to uphold it. 
In the last analysis, shifting the debate over the constitutionality of 
affirmative action to the terrain of substantive equality has definite ad-
vantages. While such a shift does not presage any earlier end to the 
debate itself, it permits a more systematic assessment of the various 
positions thus far advanced in the debate. Absent a clear conception 
of equal opportunity, Justice Marshall's position in Croson may well 
253. For example, the state should not bear responsibility for deprivations attributable to the 
acts of a foreign sovereign, or for deprivations resulting from purely private racial discrimination 
unless the state has had (or is having) a hand in sustaining it. 
254. This would occur where affirmative action would raise the prospects of success of racial 
minorities above what they would have been absent all racial discrimination. 
255. 109 S. Ct. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
256. See supra text accompanying note 172. 
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appear, in essential respects, as ungrounded as Justice O'Connor's. 
Assuming the enshrinement of equal opportunity as the Constitution's 
accepted conception of substantive equality, however, Justice Mar-
shall's opinion can be systematically rooted and justified, while those 
Qf Justices O'Connor and Scalia cannot. So long as one remains be-
hind the mystifying veil of process-based approaches, it is impossible 
to evaluate the import of professed judicial commitment to the consti-
tutionalization of equal opportunity. But if one is forced out into the 
open to defend one's substantive values, it seems most unlikely that 
the respective positions of Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Croson, and 
those of the proponents of the marginal equality position articulated in 
Bakke, could be reconciled with a genuine commitment to equal op-
portunity. Accordingly, once forced into the terrain of substantive 
equality, the proponents of these positions would either have to invoke 
a conception of substantive equality that does not rely on equal oppor-
tunity - a risky proposition, given the special place held by the prin-
ciple of equal opportunity in the American ethos257 - or open 
themselves to the charge of betraying their own professed values. In-
deed, from the standpoint of equal oppo,rtunity, stubborn adherence to 
the marginal equality position and to an overly narrow compensatory 
framewor~ may well appear to be but the means employed to insure 
the preservation of unfair advantages gained through systematic racial 
discrimination. And that is cert·ainly not an attractive prosp·ect for 
any defender of constitutional equality . 
. CONCLUSION 
Croson .is a case of considerable importance, but not necessarily for 
the reasons that are apparent initially. Settling, for the first time, on a 
single judicial test for the determination of the constitutionality of 
race-based affirmative action is undoubtedly noteworthy. Croson 's 
principal importance, however, may in the long run lie elsewhere. As 
this Article has sought to demonstrate, what is most remarkable about 
the Supreme Court's decision in Croson, is the stark contrast between 
the apparent simplicity and clarity of the legal test that the Court em-
braces and that test's inability to account coherently for the complexi-
ties inherent in the controversy that it purports to resolve. 
Accordingly, far from bringing lasting order to the constitutional de-
bate over affirmative action, Croson only manages to overcome hope-
less fragmentation by systematically decontextualizing whatever 
stands in the way of its single-minded resolve to reach its ultimate 
257. See supra note 207. 
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legal conclusion. Paradoxically, Croson's systematic decontextualiza-
tion designed to buttress the strict scrutiny test, more than any other 
single factor, points to the inherent limitations of that test, and to its 
essential unsuitability in the context of affirmative action. Thus, it is 
quite conceivable that, in their hour of triumph, the proponents of 
strict scrutiny have already planted the seeds of their own eventual 
defeat. 
This Article has concluded that the constitutional issues posed by 
affirmative action cannot be coherently or systematically resolved ex-
cept in terms of the constitutionalization of some conception of sub-
stantive equality. Moreover, assuming the constitutionalization of a 
conception based on formal means-regarding equal opportunity, this 
J\.rticle has indicated that the Plan in Croson would pass constitutional 
muster as a means to remedy the present effects of past discrimination 
resulting in continuing denials of equal opportunity rights. Consistent 
with the analysis presented in this Article, not only is Croson ulti-
mately unsuccessful in making the case for integrating affirmative ac-
tion jurisprudence into mainstream process-based equal protection 
jurisprudence, but it raises serious doubts about whether any process-
based jurisprudence can be defended as sound. Actually, perhaps the 
ultimate irony of Croson will be that the stark contradiction between 
the superficial order it imposes and the deeper turmoil it helps reveal 
will eventually pave the way to a genuine reconciliation of the treat-
ment of affirmative action with other equal protection issues under a 
vision of constitutional equality that draws explicitly on substantive 
values. 
